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THE RIGHT TO RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND WORLD 
PUBLIC ORDER: THE EMERGING NORM OF 
NONDISCRIMINATIONt 
Myres S. McDougal* 
Harold D. Lasswell** 
Lung-chu Chen*** 
1. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
DISCRIMINATION based upon religious beliefs and expressions forms 
the basis for some of the most serious deprivations of civil and 
political rights.1 The religious beliefs and expressions that are com-
monly the ground for discrimination include all of the traditional 
faiths and justifications from which norms of responsible conduct-
that is, judgments about right and wrong-are derived. These be-
liefs may be theological in the sense that they refer to a personalized 
transempirical source of an unchallengeable message or metaphysical 
in the sense that they are grounded upon nonpersonalized transempir-
ical conceptions; sometimes they are more empirical, based upon 
varying conceptions of science or fundamental humanity.2 Depriva-
tions may be imposed upon an individual because he refuses to accept 
the established belief system, adheres to a belief system different from 
the established one, attempts to create a new set of beliefs, expresses 
doubt about existing belief systems, or explicitly challenges the valid-
t This article is excerpted from a book to be published, Human Rights and 
World Public Order. The authors acknowledge with thanks the criticism and com-
ments of Professors W. Michael Reisman, Irving I. Zaretsky, and John Claydon. The 
Ralph E. Ogden Foundation has been generous in its support of the studies from 
which this article is drawn. 
* Sterling Professor of Law, Emeritus, Yale Law School. B.C.L. 1930, Oxford 
University; J.S.D. 1931, Yale; LLB. 1935, University of Mississippi.-Ed. 
** Ford Foundation Professor of Law and Social Sciences, Emeritus, Yale Law 
School. Ph.B. 1922, Ph.D. 1926, University of Chicago.-Ed. 
*** Senior Research Associate, Yale Law School. LL.B. 1958, National Taiwan 
University; LL.M. 1961, Northwestern University; LL.M. 1962, J.S.D. 1964, Yale 
University.-Ed. 
1. See generally M. BATES, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: AN INQUIRY (1945); A. 
KR.ISHNASWAMI, STUDY OF DISCRIMINATION IN THE MATIER OF RELIGIOUS RIGHTS AND 
PRACTICES, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/200/Rev.1 (1960); P. LANARES, LA LIBERTE 
RELIGIEUSE DANS LES CONVENTIONS INTERNATIONALES ET DANS LE DROIT PUBLIC 
GENERAL (1964); Abram, Freedom of Thought, Conscience and Religion, 8 J. INTL. 
CoMMN. OF JURISTS, No. 2, at 40 (1967); Claydon, The Treaty Protection of 
Religious Rights: U.N. Draft Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, 12 SANTA CLARA LAw. 
403 (1972); Toth, Human Dignity and Freedom of Conscience, 10 WORLD JUSTICE 
202 (1968). 
2. A recent outstanding survey of religious beliefs is RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS IN 
CONTEMPORARY AMERICA (I. Zaretsky & M. Leone eds. 1974) [hereinafter RELIGIOUS 
MOVEMENTS]. For a diversity of religious perspectives, see T. DoBZHANSKY, THE 
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ity of belief systems. 3 The individual may be deprived of rights ei-
ther through formal community decision-making processes or 
through less obvious workings of effective power.4 
Religious discrimination looms large in the histories of most of 
the world's distinctive religions. The common theme of these histo-
ries (with different religions appearing alternatively as oppressors and 
as victims) has been that of persecution; toleration has developed 
only at relatively late stages.5 For a long time, the established mode 
by which many religions dealt with heretics or nonbelievers was short 
and quick. The ultimate deprivation was imposed upon those who 
failed to conform. 6 In more recent times, though toleration has 
become widespread, religious discrimination still abounds and is the 
source of repressive measures that deny individuals the most basic of 
human freedoms. In the words of a United Nations study: 
World-wide interest in ensuring the right to freedom of thought, con-
science and religion stems from the realization that this right is of 
BIOLOGY OF ULTIMATE CONCERN (1967); M. ELIADE, PA1TERNS IN COMPARATIVE 
RELIGION (R. Sheed transl. 1963); M. ELIADE, THE SACRED AND TIIE PROFANE (W. 
Trash transl. 1961); S. FREUD, THE FUTURE OF AN ILLUSION (W. Robson-Scott 
transl. 1928); J. HICK, PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION (1963); w. KAUFMANN, CRITIQUE 
OF RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY (1958); W. LESSA & E. VOGT, READER IN COMPARATIVE 
RELIGION (3d ed. 1972); H. LEWIS, PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION (1965); S. MCCASLAND, 
G. CAmNS & D. Yu, RELIGIONS OF TIIE WORLD (1969); M. MEAD, TwENTIETH 
CENTURY FAITH: HOPE AND SURVIVAL 83-87 (1972); A. MONTAGU, IMMORTALITY, 
RELIGION, AND MORALS (1971); E. PARRINDER, COMPARATIVE RELIGION (1962); N. 
SMART, THE RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE OF MANKIND (1969); J. WACH, THE COM· 
PARATIVE STuoY OF RELIGIONS (1961); M. WEBER, THE SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION (T. 
Parsons ed. 1963); J. YINGER, RELIGION, SOCIE1Y AND TIIE INDIVIDUAL (1957); J. 
YINGER, THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF RELIGION (1970). 
3. Thus, deprivees can include atheists and agnostics. See generally T. ALTIZER & 
w. HAMILTON, RADICAL THEOLOGY AND TIIE DEATH OF Goo (1966); C. CAMPBELL, 
TOWARD A SOCIOLOGY OF !RRELIGION (1971); W. CLIFFORD, THE ETIIICS OF BELIEF, 
AND OTHER EsSAYS (1876); J. DEWEY, A COMMON FAITH (1934); R. RODINSON, AN 
ATIIEIST's VALUES (1964); G. VAHANIAN, THE DEATH OF Goo (1961). 
4. Important deprivations may be imposed through the internal processes of 
religious groups themselves. Sometimes these deprivations have the tacit approval of 
government; upon occasion they become the functional equivalent of government. Cf. 
Gerlach, Pentecostalism: Revolution or Counter-Revolution?, in RELIGIOUS MOVE· 
MENTS, supra note 2, at 669-99; Kauper & Ellis, Religious Corporations and tlze Law, 
71 MICH. L. REV. 1499, 1557-74 (1973). 
5. See H. KAMEN, THE RISE OF TOLERATION (1967); Adeney, Toleration, 12 
ENCYC. OF RELIGION AND ETHICS 360 (J. Hastings ed. 1958). See also J. BIGELOW, 
TOLERATION AND OTHER EsSAYS AND STUDIES (1927); W. GARRISON, INTOLERANCE 
(1934); G. MENSCHING, TOLERANCE AND TRUTH IN RELIGION (H. Klimkeit transl. 
1971). In the words of Garrison: 
History is made up very largely of the record of man's intolerance to man. 
Part of that record is red with the blood of its victims and vibrant with their 
groans. Part of it also is warm with the glow of the faith and zeal of those 
who have sought, at their own peril, to turn others from the error of their ways 
or to break down some system which they deemed hostile to the welfare of men. 
But the story of intolerance is also the story of all the world's prophets and 
~aviours, its moral leaders and social reformers, as well as its tyrants and inquis-
itors. 
W. GARRISON, supra, at x. 
6. See text at notes 28-38 infra. 
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primary importance. In the past, its denial has led not only to untold 
misery, but also to persecutions directed against entire groups of peo-
ple. Wars have been waged in the name of religion or belief, either 
with the aim of imposing upon the vanquished the faith of the victor 
or as a pretext for extending economic or political domination. Al-
though the number of such instances occurring in the second half of 
our century is on the decline, it must not be forgotten that mankind 
only recently has witnessed persecutions on a more colossal scale than 
ever before. And even today, notwithstanding changes in the climate 
of opinion, equality of treatment is not ensured for all religions and 
beliefs, or for their followers, in certain areas of the world. 7 
The relevant deprivations imposed upon individuals invariably 
involve the rectitude value itself, denying participation in the formula-
tion and expression of moral norms. Individuals may be denied, 
both in form and in substance, the freedom to worship as they choose; 
they may be terrorized from worshipping, or they may be brain-
washed or coerced into following a belief system other than that of 
their own choosing (e.g., compulsory conversions).8 These types of 
repressive measures are particularly likely to occur in those communi-
ties in which an established belief system is officially sanctioned and 
sustained to the exclusion of other beliefs. 9 History is full of examples 
7. A. KRISHNASWAMI, supra note 1, at v. In the words of Claydon: 
Even a cursory survey of matters considered by the United Nations in the past 
twenty-five years demonstrates the extent to which religious differences continue 
to contribute to major and minor problems of world order. Such a list might 
include the following items: religious persecution in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Ru-
mania, 1949; the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan; the treatment of 
Buddhists in South Vietnam, 1963; the actions of the People's Republic of China 
in Tibet, 1959-61; the Cyprus problem; the continuing Middle East crisis; and 
the current situation in Northern Ireland. In all of these cases the religious 
factor has operated in varying degrees either to precipitate or to exacerbate an 
international crisis; in most violence has been a component. 
Claydon, supra note 1, at 403. 
Useful contemporary area studies of the interaction of religion and politics include 
R. BUSH, RELIGION IN COMMUNIST CHINA (1970); J. COQUJA, CHURCH AND STATE 
LAW IN THE PHILIPPINES (1959); G. MAcEOIN, NORTHERN IRELAND: CAPTIVE OF 
HISTORY 123-44 (1974); D. MACINNIS, RELIGIOUS POLICY AND PRACTICE IN COM-
MUNIST CHINA (1972); RELIGION, PoLmcs, AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN THE THIRD 
WORLD (D. Smith ed. 1971); D. SCHMEISER, CIVIL LIBERTIES IN CANADA 54-124 
(1964); SOUTH ASIAN POLITICS AND RELIGION (D. Smith ed. 1966). 
S. See, e.g., Arnold, Persecution (Muhammadan), 9 ENCYC. OF RELIGION AND 
ETHICS 765, 767 (J. Hastings ed. 1960). Similar treatment is reported to occur in the 
Soviet Union. See v. CHALIDZE, To DEFEND THESE RIGHTS: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE 
SOVIET UNION 159 (G. Daniels transl. 1974). Cf. H. SMITH, THE RussIANS 417-38 
(1976); Jancar, Religious Dissent in the Soviet Union, in DISSENT IN THE USSR: 
POLITICS, IDEOLOGY, AND PEOPLE 191 (R. Tokes ed. 1975); Reddaway, Freedom of 
Worship and the Law, in IN QUEST OF JusncE: PROTEST AND DISSENT IN THE SOVIET 
UNION TODAY 62 (1970). 
9. See, e.g., Roman Catholicism, History of, 15 ENCYC. BRIT. 1002, 1006-07 (15th 
ed. 1974). 
Underscoring the central importance of "religious persecution" to Marxism. 
Solzhenitsyn offers this footnote: "Sergei Bulgakov showed in Karl Marx as a 
Religious Type (1906) that atheism is the chief inspirational and emotional hub of 
Marxism and that all the rest of the doctrine has simply been tacked on. Ferocious 
868 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 74:865 
of religious oppression through such means as the destruction of 
altars, images, churches, temples, and the holy scriptures.10 
Deprivations of power on rectitude grounds are dramatized by the 
conflicts between church and state.11 The religiously persecuted 
have been forced to leave the community of which they were mem-
bers and in consequence have been completely excluded from the 
power processes of the body politic. For many, the result has been 
centuries of wandering as homeless refugees and exiles in perpetual 
fear and jeopardy-a phenomenon that has yet to see an end.12 The 
barbarity of banishment is sometimes confined within national 
boundaries when the persecuted are dispatched to remote, sparsely 
populated, and rugged frontiers.13 Conversely, people may be de-
nied egress, either temporarily or permanently, because of their relig-
hostility to religion is Marxism's most persistent feature." A. SOLZHENITSYN, LB'ITER 
TO 'IHE SOVIET LEADERS 58-59 (H. Sternberg transl. 1975). See also Bourdeaux, 
Religions in the Soviet Union (1960-71): Introduction, in THE FoUR'IH WORLD: 
VICTIMS OF GROUP OPPRESSION 218, 222 (B. Whitaker ed. 1972); Shararevich, 
Socialism in Our Past and Future, in A. SoLZHENITSYN, et al., FROM UNDER THE 
RUBBLE 26 (M. Scammell, et al. transl. 1975). 
In the People's Republic of China, the Religious Affairs Bureau came into 
existence in the early years of the regime. The functions of the Bureau include the 
following: 
1. To regularly investigate and study religious organizations and the activities 
of their personnel. 
2. To control all types of religious activity. 
3. To lead both Catholics and Protestants into the Three-Self Movement, and 
to organize Buddhists, Taoists, and Muslims for regular patriotic learning ses-
sions. 
4. To carry out thoroughly the religious policy of the central government. 
5. To unceasingly teach and propagandize religious leaders and all believers 
concerning policies of the state with respect to current situations in order to 
raise their political awareness. 
6. To bring church leaders closer to the government and push believers of all 
religions into a positive alliance for the construction of socialism. 
7. To strike at politically obstinate reactionaries in churches, and cooperate 
with public security officers in order to tranquilize hidden counterrevolution-
aries in all religions. 
8. To entertain foreign religious guests. 
R. BusH, supra note 7, at 31 (footnote omitted). See also D. MACINNIS, supra note 
7, at 373; G. PATTERSON, CHRISTIANITY IN COMMUNIST CHINA 3-4 (1969). Other 
works dealing with religion and communism include J. BENNETT, CHRISTIANITY AND 
COMMUNISM TODAY (1970); H. CHAMBRE, CHRISTIANITY AND CoMMUNISM (R. 
Trevett transl. 1960); M. D'ARCY, COMMUNISM AND CHRISTIANITY (1957); A. 
GALTER, THE RED BOOK OF 'IHE PERSECUTED CHuRCH (1957); G, MACEoIN, THE 
COMMUNIST WAR ON RELIGION (1951). 
10. See, e.g., L. DAWIDOWICZ, THE WAR AGAINST THE JEWS 1933-1945, at 248 
(1975); J. GOFF, THE PERSECUTION OF PROTESTANT CHRISTIANS IN COLOMBIA, 1948-
1958, at 4/35-4/45 (1968) (SONDEOS No. 23); Adeney, supra note 5, at 361; 
Gwatkin, Pers(!cution (Early Church), 9 .ENCYC. OF RELIGION AND ETHICS 742, 743, 
747 (J. Hastings ed. 1960). 
11. Cf. G. LEWY, RELIGION AND REVOLUTION (1974); S. STEINBERG, THE THIRTY 
YEARS WAR AND 'IHE CONFLICT FOR EUROPEAN HEGEMONY 1600-1660, at 96-99 
(1966); C. WEDGWOOD, THE THIRTY YEARS WAR (1938). 
12. For a comprehensive historical account, see F. NORWOOD, STRANGERS AND 
Ex!LES: A HISTORY OF RELIGIOUS REFUGEES (1969). 
13. Whitley, Persecution (Modern Christian), 9 ENCYC, OF RELIGION AND E'IHICS 
755, 758 (J. Hastings ed. 1960). 
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ious background, 14 and nationals of ceiitain religious faiths may be 
denied access to their own country.15 In some notorious inquisitions, 
the methods employed against nonconformists have been completely 
arbitrary, involving no less than a total denial of due process of law.16 
Less drastically, holding or expressing particular religious beliefs may 
be made a criminal offense.17 The entire arsenal of criminal sanc-
tions, including fine, imprisonment, banishment, and capital punish-
ment, may be mobilized to enforce religious conformity.18 Another 
frequent deprivation is to forbid religious nonconformists to hold 
assemblies.19 
An individual's rights to vote or to hold office may be affected by 
religious identification, even in communities with no established relig-
ion. "Where there is an Established Church or a State religion," 
according to a United Nations study, "persons who leave the officially 
recognized religion are sometimes deprived of their political rights, 
including the right to vote."20 Sometimes, "clerics of the official 
religion may be regarded as officials of the Government while those 
of other groups do not enjoy such a status."21 Eligibility for high 
governmental posts, including the head of state, may, "either by law 
or by tradition," be confined to those who hold the officially sanc-
tioned religious beliefs. 22 In communities where "several religions 
are officially recognized," discrimination may result from the use of 
"quota systems" in allocating "elective and appointive posts in the 
public service"; such systems may stress "community membership" 
14. For a discussion of such practices in the Soviet Union, see J. INGLES, STUDY 
OF DISCRIMINATION IN REsPECT OF nm RIGHTS OF EVERYONE To LEAVE ANY 
COUNTRY, INcuJDING His OWN, AND To RETURN TO His COUNTRY 25-29, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/220/Rev.1 (1963); W. KoREY, THE SOVIET CAGE: ANTI-SEMmsM IN 
RUSSIA 184-200 (1973). See also V. CHALIDZE, supra note 8, at 92-114; A. SAK-
HAROV, MY CoUNTRY AND nm WORLD 51-61 (G. Daniels transl. 1975); A. SAK-
HAROV, SAKHAROV SPEAKS 159-63 (H. Salisbury ed. 1974); Shroeter, How They Left: 
Varieties of Soviet Jewish Exit Experience, 2 SOVIET JEWISH AFFAIRS 9 (1972). 
15. J. INGLES, supra note 14, at 28-29. 
16. The methods employed have been said to include "[t]he spy system, delation, 
secrecy, torture, the union in one person of judge and accuser, the hindrances put in 
the way of the victim's defence, the direct interest of the tribunal in a condemnation 
which secured the confiscation of the property of the accused." Fawkes, Persecution 
(Roman Catholic), 9 ENCYc. OF REUGION AND Em1cs 749, 753 (J. Hastings ed. 
1960). For a detailed case study, see H. KAMEN, THE SPANISH lNQmsmoN 137-96 
(1965). 
17. See, e.g., Gwatkin, supra note 10, at 742, 746. 
18. See, e.g., Nelson, The Theory of Persecution, in PERSECUTION AND LmERlY: 
EsSAYS IN HONOR OF GEORGE LINCOLN BURR 3 (1931) (Christian practices). See 
generally Labrousse, Religious Toleration, 4 DICTIONARY OF THE HISTORY OF !DEAS 
112, 115 (P. Wiener ed. 1973). 
19. Gwatkin, supra note 10, at 747. 
20. H. SANTA CRuz, STuDY OF DISCRIMINATION IN mE MATTER OF PoUTICAL 
RIGHTS 34, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/213/Rev.1 (1962). 
21. Id. 
22. Id. See also J. LAPoNCE, THE PROTECTION OF MINORITIES 49-50 (1960). 
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rather than "merit" and exclude from public service "members of 
religious communities not recognized by the State."23 
In the area of educational opportunities, individuals may find 
access to public education, or educational resources and facilities, 
restricted because of their religious backgrounds. Such deprivations 
cannot be dismissed as historic curiosities. According to a United 
Nations study, "qualified candidates in some parts of the world still 
find their religion a barrier when they apply for admission to certain 
educational institutions."24 "Although this discrimination is not 
overt and is in many cases contrary to the law," the study adds, "it 
nevertheless persists and affects a considerable number of persons."2G 
The intricate relationship between religion and education, especially 
in regard to religious instruction, may precipitate community tension 
and conflict. 26 In addition, among the ubiquitous means of main-
taining religious conformity are the policies designed to preserve an 
ignorant public and to stifle individual freedom of expression. Noto-
rious examples of book burning abound in history.27 Limited access 
to the means of enlightenment often results in limited opportunities 
for the acquisition and exercise of socially useful skills. 
In a community in which discrimination takes the form of perse-
cution, severe deprivations of well-being may ensue, ranging from the 
imprisonment and torture of individuals to the physical extermination 
of entire populations (genocide). 28 The barbarity of such depriva-
23. H. SANTA CRuz, supra note 20, at 35. Difficult problems arise when an 
individual leaves a group in which religious process is the functional equivalent of 
civil process. See, e.g., Zaretsky, Jesus in Jerusalem 1973: Mission Impossible?, in 
HEBREW CHRISTIANITY: ToE THIR.TEENTII TRIBE 341, 350-52 (B. Sobel ed. 1974). 
24. C. .AMMOUN, SnIDY OF DISCRIMINATION IN EDUCATION 56, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/181/Rev.1 (1957). 
25. Id. 
26. This is- most visible in cases in which proselytization is used as a form of 
public information. See Zaretsky, supra note 23, at 383-85. Cf. L. DB CAMP, ToB 
GREAT MONKEY 'TRIAL (1968); EVOLUTION AND RELIGION: ToE CONFLICT BETWEEN 
ScIENCE AND ToEoLOGY IN MODERN .AMERICA (G. Kennedy ed. 1957); R. MORGAN, 
ToB PoLmcs OF RELIGIOUS CONFLICT (1968). 
21. See, e.g., Gwatkin, supra note 10, at 747. 
In a fashion less dramatic than book burning, the Nationalist Chinese government, 
in January 1975, confiscated some 2300 copies of Bibles in romanized Taiwanese 
(some of them in the Tayal tribal language) from the Protestant community in 
Taiwan. This much protested act in violation of religious freedom is another step in 
a series of governmental measures designed to ban the use of the Taiwanese language 
and to suppress the Taiwanese (non-Chinese) identity of the Taiwanese people. See 
The Washington Post, May 2, 1975, at C7, col. 4; The Confiscation of the Taiwanese 
Bibles by the Nationalist Chinese Government, 11 MAYFLOWER 7 (July 20, 1975) 
(published by the Formosan Club of America, Inc.); Joint Statement Concerning the 
Taiwanese Bibles, 116 TAIWAN CHENGLIAN 23 (June 1975) (published by World 
United Formosans for Independence); Tang, On the Incident of Confiscating the 
Taiwanese Bibles, 177 TAIWAN CHENGLIAN-34 (July 1975). 
28. The Nazi Holocaust is a well-remembered example of such practices. See R. 
HILBERG, DESTRUCTION OF TiiE EUROPEAN JEWS (1961); H. KRAUSNICK, H, BUCH• 
HEIM, M. BROSZHAT & H. JACOBSEN, ToE .ANATOMY OF THE SS-STATE (1968); N. 
LEVIN, ToE HOLOCAUST: ToE DESTRUCTION OF TiiE EUROPEAN JEWRY (1968); R. 
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tions has been vividly recorded: "[T]he extirpation of heresy by 
fetter and by fire";29 victims "worried by dogs, or crucified, or burned 
as lights for the performances" in emperor's gardens;30 victims "left to 
die of famine in prison";31 issuance of edicts requiring "all persons," 
including "women and boys," to be sacrificed;32 "great massacre";33 
"public executions" ;34 "wholesale burnings" ;35 "the most terrible 
form of fire and slaughter";36 extermination "by sword, by hurling 
from. the summits of cliffs, by prolonged confinement in deadly 
prisons, at the stake, in the mines";37 and survivors "sent in chains 
into slavery."38 
With regard to the right to acquire and dispose of property, an 
individual's religious identification not infrequently becomes a source 
of discrimination. Nonconformists may have their property confis-
cated, 39 groups who profess particular religious faiths may be 
forbidden the right to own land, 40 public funds may be dispensed 
MANVELL & H. FltAENKEL, THE INCOMPARABLE CRIME (1967); L. POLIAKOV, HARVEST 
OF HATE (1954); G. REITLINGER, THE FINAL SoLUTION (2d ed. 1968); J. TENEN-
BAUM, RACE AND REICH (2d ed. 1956); Holocaust, 8 ENCYC. JUDAICA 827 (1971). 
29. Labrousse, supra note 18, at 115. 
30. Gwatkin, supra note 10, at 744. 
31. Id. at 746. 
32. Id. 
33. Id. at 747. 
34. Id. at 748. 
35. Id. 
36. Geden, Persecution (Indian), 9 ENCYC. OF RELIGION AND ETHICS 762, 764 (J. 
Hastings ed. 1960). 
37. 2 T. LINDSAY, A HISTORY OF THE REFORMATION 601 (1907). Hence, this 
observation: "But the horrors enacted in open court are a very small part of the 
mischiefs of persecution. We must take account of imprisonments and hardships 
from which even death is sometimes a relief, and of the sufferings of those who live 
in fear of death or yield to fear of death. Worse than this is the brutalizing of the 
persecutors, and worst of all the demoralization of the persecuted." Gwatkin, supra 
note 10, at 748. 
38. Gwatkin, supra note 10, at 747. 
Deprivations are sometimes inflicted by the victims themselves because of reli-
gious beliefs in the community. Such believers may deny themselves the benefits of 
modem medical treatment by relying on spiritual healing only, by refusing vaccina-
tion and physical examination, and by refusing blood transfusions. See generally C. 
ANTIEAU, P. CARROLL & T. BURKE, RELIGION UNDER THE STATE CONSTITUTIONS 67-72 
(1965); M. COLE, JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES (1955); D. GROSS, THE CASE FOR SPIRITUAL 
HEALING (1958); J. VAN BAALEN, THE CHAOS OF CULTS (3d ed. 1960); Burkholder, 
"The Law Knows No Heresy": Marginal Religious Movements and tlze Courts, in 
RELIGIOUS MOVEMENT, supra note 2, at 27, 36-41; Garrison, Sectarianism and 
Psychosocial Adjustment: A Controlled Comparison of Puerto Rican Pentecostals and 
Catholics, in id. at 298-319; Pfeffer, The Legitimation of Marginal Religions in the 
United States, in id. at 9, 17-20; Torrey, Spiritualists and Shamans as Psychothera-
pists: An Account of Original Anthropological Sin, in id. at 330-37; Cawley, Criminal 
Liability in Faith Healing, 39 MINN. L. REV. 48 (1954); Note, The Refused Blood 
Transfusion: An Ultimate Challenge for Law and Morals, 10 NATURAL L.F. 202 
(1965). 
39. See, e.g., Gwatkin, supra note 10, at 747. 
40. Such prohibition may take different forms: (1) only members of the state 
religion can own land; (2) no members of any religion may own land; and (3) 
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in a manner that clearly discriminates against certain religious 
groups, 41 and religious quotas may be imposed in employment. 42 In 
the words of an International Labour Office (ILO) study: 
The most numerous charges of discrimination would seem to relate 
to access to jobs in both the public service and the private sector. 
The acts of discrimination complained of appear to consist for the 
most part in the imposition of religious tests in selecting candidates 
for public appointments and the granting of preferences to members 
of particular faiths when engaging workers or taking on apprentices. 
However, discrimination may also occur in certain situations against 
people who belong to any religion at all, against atheists or against 
those who do not profess any faith whatever. 48 
Religious discrimination continues to have an important effect 
upon the shaping and sharing of the affection value. People of 
different religious backgrounds may be prohibited by legal or reli-
gious proscription from marrying one another.44 Violators may be 
subjected to severe legal penalties or to social opprobrium. On a 
more general level, religious barriers tend to stifle the growth of 
congenial personal relationships. 
Finally, even in the most modern societies it is not always easy for 
people of different religions to share a sense of mutual respect. 
Religious antagonists have been "D]ikened to the poisoner of wells, 
the arsonist, the counterfeiter, and the murderer--the heresiarch and 
the votaries whom he enticed were pictured as public pests which the 
authorities had the solemn obligation to purge from the face of the 
earth."45 At one time, religious nonconformists were simply "re-
duced to slavery."46 Today, individuals may enjoy differing degrees 
of prestige because of differences in religious affiliations. Religion 
almost invariably figures significantly in the class structure of a 
community, especially where it is highly rigidified and hierarchical. 47 
members of some religions subjected to persecution may not own land. For instance, 
see the case of Emma Berger in Israel described in Zaretsky, supra note 23, at 388, 
398 n.27. 
41. See P. KAUPER, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 18-19 (1964); J. LAPONCB, 
supra note 22, at 48. 
42. W. KOREY, supra note 14, at 52. 
On occasion, discrimination in employment may be imposed against people who 
are religiously forbidden to work on those days when the employer wants them to 
work. See Burkholder, supra note 38, at 33-36; Pfeffer, supra note 38, at 17-20. 
43. INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICB, FIGIITING DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT 
AND OCCUPATION 98 (1968). 
44. See A KRISHNASWAMI, supra note 1, at 38; 3 A. STOKES, CiluRCH AND STATB 
IN THE UNITED SrATES 52-56 (1950). Cf. Geden, supra note 36, at 764-65. 
45. Labrousse, supra note 18, at 115. 
46. See Gwatkin, supra note 10, at 747. 
47. See McDougal, Lasswell & Chen, The Protection of Respect and Human 
Rights: Freedom of Choice and World Public Order, 24 AM. U. L. REv. 919, 983-84 
(1915). See also T. O'DBA, THB SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION 55-97 (1966). 
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JI. BASIC COMMUNITY POLICIES 
In a community genuinely committed to the goal of human 
dignity, one paramount policy should be to honor and defend the 
freedom of the individual to choose a fundamental orientation toward 
the world. One of the most distinctive acts available to man as a 
rational being is the continual redefinition of the self in relation to 
others and to the cosmos. Thus, each individual must be free to 
search for the basic postulates in a perspective that will unify the 
experiences of life. All practices that both differentiate among indi-
viduals upon the basis of religious beliefs and expressions, whether 
conceived and justified in transempirical or empirical terms, and 
deprive the individual of the freedom to inquire and choose are 
wholly incompatible with preferred policy. 48 
Even so fundamental a freedom as that of religious inquiry, 
belief, and communication must, of course, be exercised and protected 
with due regard for the comparable rights of others and for the 
aggregate common interest in the preservation of all basic human 
rights. 49 Whether a particular practice is an appropriate exercise of 
religious freedom or is an unreasonable invasion of the rights of 
others may occasionally present a difficult and delicate question for 
community choice. The rational procedure for guiding community 
choice about such questions in the area of religious freedom, as in the 
case of other rights, is the disciplined use of a contextual analysis that 
investigates and assays the consequences of available options; no prior 
definitional exercises, however elaborate, can eliminate the need for 
inquiry and choice in the social process. 50 
48. The arbitrariness of differentiations by generic reference to religion is evident 
in the difficulties of defining "religion." As with the notion of "race," specialists 
on religion as well as nonspecialists can hardly agree upon a commonly acceptable 
definition. What are the criteria of "religious" groups: birth, devotions by one or 
both parents, self-definition and proclamation, conversion, conversion by group, or 
something else? Labeling people on the basis of religion, as on the basis of race, is 
easily susceptible of abuse. See Hollingsworth, Constitutional Religious Protection: 
Antiquated Oddity or Vital Reality?, 34 Omo Sr. L.J. 15 (1973); Zaretsky, supra note 
23. 
49. The presumption against discrimination upon grounds of religion is not 
intended to obscure the fact that a community may have a deep interest in the quality 
of the rectitude standard of its members. Some religious concepts may be highly 
inimical to a public order of human dignity. It may on occasion be necessary to 
distinguish between discrimination upon religious grounds and the maintenance of an 
appropriate system of rectitude. The formation and proselytization of religious 
movements that emphasize some conceptions of pacifism may, for instance, be 
regarded as inimical to community security in some contexts. 
See, e.g., Marnell, Civil Disobedience and the Majority of One, in RELIGION AND 
nm PUBLIC ORDER 115 (D. Giannella ed. 1969). Cf., e.g., Casad, Compulsory 
Education and Individual Rights, in id. at 51; Coughlin, Values and the Constitution, 
in id. at 89. 
50. See McDougal, Human Rights and World Public Order: Principles of Content 
and Procedure for Clarifying General Community Policy, 14 VA. J. INTL. L. 387 
(1974); McDougal, Lasswell & Chen, supra note 47, at 927-37, 1037. See also Mc-
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None of the arguments historically put forward to impugn the 
policy of religious toleration carry much weight in a complex and 
interactive world. Attempts have been made to justify intolerance on 
the ground that a single faith has unique access to revealed truth (a 
monopoly of truth), 51 or that intolerance is necessary for the "salva-
tion" of individuals who are outside the mainstream of religious 
belief. 52 More secular and pragmatic arguments allege the necessity 
of achieving and maintaining community unity and cohesion against 
the perils of fragmentation into nonconformist groups. r;a The spe-
cious nature of claims to a monopoly of truth or exclusive access to 
transempirical salvation would appear amply demonstrated by the 
failure of any of the diverse belief systems present in the contempo-
rary world to establish unique or exclusive successes in either empiri-
Dougal, Lasswell & Chen, The Aggregate lnteresi in Shared Respect and Huma11 
Rights: The Harmonization of Public Order and Civic Order (forthcoming). 
In response to the conventional "action-belier' dichotomy for policy differentia-
tion used in American jurisprudence, Kurland has emphasized that "this proposed 
distinction • . • [is] obviously not a line that can provide real assistance in resolving 
these knotty problems." P. KURLAND, RELIGION AND Tl:IB LAW 22 (1962). Similarly, 
Burkholder observes: 
If we ask just how the limits of religious freedom are set by the courts, it is 
clear that no one definitive rationale for adjudication has emerged. The jurists 
have developed a number of testing procedures-secular regulation, interest 
weighing, clear and present danger, compelling state interest, alternative means 
-but only the first of these offers a self-evident approach. In creating the 
possibility of carving out an exemption from existing legislation for certain kinds 
of religiously motivated action, and justifying this exemption by balancing re-
ligious conviction against public policy, the Sherbert formula tended to favor a 
case-by-case procedure. We have seen how court opinions may vary widely in 
their application of this balancing technique. 
Burkholder, supra note 38, at 45. 
51. In his essay on Sir James MacKintosh, Macaulay described such views: "I am 
in the right, and you are in the wrong. When you are the stronger, you ought to 
tolerate me; for it is your duty to tolerate truth. But when I am stronger, I shall 
persecute you; for it is my duty to persecute error." T. MACAULAY, CRITICAL AND 
HISTORICAL EssAYS 336 (1870). Cf. N. SODERBLOM, THE LIVING GoD: BASAL FORMS 
OF PERSONAL RELIGION (1933); R. ZAEHNER, AT SUNDRY 'IiMES (1958). 
52. "[A) body of truths existed, some still latent, some explicitly stated in 
dogmas, necessary and vital; so vital that, unless a man accepted them, he would 
without doubt perish everlastingly •••. " Whitley, supra note 13, at 755. Augustine 
is said to have compared "the laws against heretics to the restraint imposed upon 
lunatics or persons suffering under delirium, who would otherwise destroy themselves 
and others." Fawkes, supra note 16, at 751, 752. Cf. S. BRANDON, HISTORY, 'IiME 
AND DEITY (1965); S. BRANDON, MAN AND His DESTINY IN THE GREAT RELIGIONS 
(1962). 
53. Labrousse has aptly summarized: "If one reflects upon it, one is struck by the 
coherence and doctrinal consistency of the ideological justifications provided for the 
practice of religious intolerance. The system of justification stands up admirably on 
all levels, and the unavoidable sociological necessity for a minimum consensus gives it 
an imperative accent. This necessity for consensus has not disappeared from among 
us •••. " Labrousse, supra note 18, at 115-16. A similar observation was offered 
by Fawkes: "Cohesion was the first need of primitive societies; it was more important 
that the group should cohere than it should progress. Innovation, therefore, was put 
down with a strong hand: it introduced disunion and dissipated energy-the argument 
is not unknown in our own time." Fawkes, supra note 16, at 749. 
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cal or transempirical inquiry.54 Moreover, underlying all of the 
theories of religious intolerance is an assumption that is essentially 
contrary to respect for human dignity-an assumption that implies a 
profound distrust of the wisdom of allowing individuals to take the 
responsibility for their own beliefs. If human experience is a reliable 
guide, it would appear that individuals will not experience an intense 
demand on the self to act responsibly on behalf of the common 
interest unless they are free to pursue their own search to relate the 
ego to other beings and to the universal manifold of events. The 
attempt to impose uniformity in such fundamental matters stifles and 
frustrates personal development and fu1fillment. Similarly, it would 
appear that, in the long run, social order and individual well-being 
can be better achieved through open examination and choice of 
fundamental orientations than through regimented religious mono-
lithism. 55 
The importance of individual freedom of inquiry and commit-
ment to community consensus about shaping and sharing of values 
has been aptly summarized by Abram: 
Since that formative period of the concepts of religious liberty in the 
seventeenth century, differing justifications of the right to freedom of 
thought, conscience or belief have been advanced. Some, like Mill, 
have stressed the fallibility of human thought and belief; others, like 
Dewey, have argued the social benefits derivable from plurality of 
belief and freedom of inquiry; and others have calculated the com-
parative risks for social value of a policy of freedom, as opposed to 
the risks of repression. One conclusion from the number and variety 
of such justifications is that no single theological, secular or philosoph-
ical foundation is presupposed in the belief in the right to freedom 
of thought, conscience and religion. Defenders of the ideal and insti-
tutions of freedom do not and need not share metaphysical, theologi-
cal or psychological beliefs; rather, they share a commitment to the 
54. See generally w. CHRISTIAN, MEANING AND TR.um IN RELIGION (1964); B. 
MITCHELL, THE JUSTIFICATION OF RELIGIOUS BELIEF ( 1973). 
55. The classic exposition of this policy is J. LocKE, LBTI'ERS CONCERNING 
TOLERATION (1765). In 1689, the year the Act of Toleration was proclaimed in 
England, Locke's first Letter was anonymously published in Holland in Latin and 
translated into English immediately afterward. Three other Letters soon followed, 
largely in response to criticism. Emphasizing that the legitimate sphere of the state 
extends to external matters rather than internal matters such as religion, Locke 
maintained that not only the basic doctrines and articles of faith, but also the outward 
manifestations and rites of worship are to be kept beyond the reach of the civil 
authority. Not only religious toleration but also disestablishment of religion was 
suggested. 
See R. AARON, JOHN LOCKE 24-25, 39-40, 52, 295-99 (1937); J. DUNN, THE 
PoLmCAL THOUGHT OF JOHN LocKE 27-40 (1969). 
·For an excellent contemporary exposition of the policies favoring toleration, see 
P. KAUPER, supra note 41, at 13-44. Cf. R. BAINTON, THE TR.AVAIL OF RELIGIOUS 
LmERTY (1951); s. HOOK, RELIGION IN A FREE Socu:;ry (1967); P. MILLER, ET AL., 
RELIGION AND FREEDOM OF THOUGIIT (1954); C. NORTiiCOTT, RELIGIOUS LmERlY 
(1948); R. POLLARD, CONSCIBNCE AND LmERTY (1940). 
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value of freedom in the life of the community and an appreciation 
of the fruits of freedom for society and the individual. 66 
ill. TR.ENDS IN DECISION 
The development of transnational principles of religious freedom 
begins within the body politic of national communities. Even within 
these communities, the journey toward religious tolerance has been 
slow and tortuous. "Ancient society," it has been noted, "was essen-
tially intolerant."67 Though the concepts of religious toleration and 
religious freedom were articulated at relatively early stages in his-
tory, 58 their transformation into national prescription and practice has 
been gradual. "Tolerance," observed Arcot Krishnaswami in his 
outstanding study, "was accorded, in the beginning, to one or a few 
specified religions or beliefs; and only later was it extended to all such 
groups. Moreover, the measure of tolerance extended to various 
groups was often very narrow at first, and only by a gradual expan-
sion was full equality achieved."69 Krishnaswami also noted that 
"[s]truggles for freedom of religion and conscience have occurred 
chiefly in Europe. For many historic non-European religions, which 
developed without having the feeling of possessing absolute and 
exclusive religious truth, the problem of toleration did not take so 
acute a form."60 
In Europe, the drive toward religious toleration became signifi-
cant after the Protestant Reformation. 61 The formal incorporation of 
the principle of religious toleration into national law first appeared in 
Switzerland and Transylvania, two relatively small multi-religious 
communities bordering the great empires. 62 In Switzerland, under 
the Peaces of Kappel of 1529 and 1531, each canton was empowered 
to decide which faith, Reformed or Catholic, its inhabitants would 
observe. 63 In the "common bailiwicks, ruled by Reformed and Cath-
56. Abram, supra note 1, at 44-45. 
57. Gwatkin, supra note 10, at 743. 
58. See Bainton, Sebastian Castellio and the Toleration Controversy of the 
Sixteenth Century, in PERSECUTION AND LIBERTY: EssAYS JN HONOR OF GEORGE 
LINCOLN BURR 183 (1931). Cf. M. BATES, supra note 1, at 378-473; D. BURT, THE. 
STATE AND RELIGIOUS TOLERATION: AsPECTS OF TiiB CHURCH-STATE THEORIES OF 
FoUR CHRISTIAN THINKERS (1960); Bainton, The Parable of the Tares as the Proof 
Text for Religious Liberty to the End of the Sixteenth Century, 1 CHURCH HIST. 67 
(1932). 
59. A. KrusHNASWAMI, supra note 1, at 4. 
60. Quoted in Toth, supra note 1, at 208. 
61. See generally R. BAINTON, THE REFORMATION OF nm SIXTBBNTII CENTURY 
(1952); M. Bates, supra note 1, at 148-86; 0. CHADWICK, THE REFORMATION (1965); 
G. ELTON, REFORMATION EUROPE, 1517-1599 (1964); H. GRIMM, THE REFORMATION 
ERA, 1500-1650, at 588-92 (1954); T. LINDSAY, supra note 37; R. POST, THE. MODERN 
DEVOTION: CONFRONTATION WITH REFORMATION AND HUMANISM (1968); Bainton, 
The Struggle for Religious Liberty, 10 CHURCH HIST. 95 (1941). 
62. Toth, supra note 1, at 209. 
63. A. KrusHNASWAMI, supra note 1, at 4; Toth, supra note 1, at 209. 
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olic cantons in common,"64 the Catholic minorities were allowed to 
adhere to their faith alongside the Protestant majority. 65 In the 
Principality of Transylvania (then part of the Kingdom of Hungary), 
individuals enjoyed freedom of conscience and religion as early as 
1538 under a decree by the Diet of Torda,66 which was reaffirmed in 
1571. In 1555, Germany officially justified freedom of religion in 
terms of "the will of the sovereignty," "the Raison d'etat."67 In 
France, ,after the religious wars of 1562 to 1598, Henry IV issued the 
famous Ediot of Nantes, conferring upon ithe Calvinists. (the Hugu~ 
nots) specific civil liberties, including "the right to worship in specified 
places."68 In England, the Toleration Act of 1689 secured personal 
toleration for Protestants of all sorts, although Protestant dissenters 
from the Church of England still remained under certain disabili-
ties. 69 
The French and American revolutions brought with them a shift 
in "emphasis from the principle of mere toleration under the aegis of 
enlightened despotism to that of a more effective freedom and equal-
ity of worship."70 The Declaration of the Rights of Man, issued in 
1789 after the French Revolution, specified freedom of religious ex-
pression as within the scope of human rights entitled to protection: 
''No man is to be interfered with because of his opinions, not even 
because of religious opinions, provided his avowal of them does not 
disturb public order as established by law."71 Many European immi-
grants who settled in the New World brought with them the growing 
expectation of religious freedom, and the principle of religious liberty 
gradually spread throughout the colonies. The Constitution of the 
United States prescribed, in article VI, that "no religious Test shall 
ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust 
under the United States." The first amendment, adopted in 1791, 
further stated that "Congress shall make no law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."72 With 
64. A. KrusHNASWAMI, supra note 1, at 4. 
65. Id.; Toth, supra note 1, at 209. 
66. Toth, supra note 1, at 209. 
61. Id. This was based on the doctrine "cujus regio eius religio" embodied in the 
Treaty of Augsburg of 1555. 
68. A. KruSHNASWAMI, supra note 1, at 5. Unfortunately, the Edict of Nantes of 
1598 was revoked in 1685 by Louis XIV, who ordered the destruction of the Calvinist 
temples and forbade Calvinists to leave the country. 
69. M. BATES, supra note 1, at 168-79. 
70. De Ruggiero, Religious Freedom, in 13 ENcrc. Soc. Ser. 239, 244 (E. 
Selgman & A. Johnson eds. 1934). 
71. BASIC DOCUMENTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS 9 (I. Brownlie ed. 1971). 
72. This part of the first amendment contains both the establishment clause and 
the free-exercise clause. ''The essence of the religious freedom guaranteed by our 
Constitution is therefore this: no religion shall either receive the state's support or 
incur its hostility." West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 654 
(1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Similarly, Konvitzhas observed: 
The Free Exercise Clause protects one against coercion to do what one does not 
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the passage of time, this fundamental guarantee of religious freedom, 
building upon the principle of separation of church and state, has been 
amplified and strengthened by a series of judicial decisions. 73 
Influenced by the examples set by France and the United States, 
"[i]n the written constitutions of the nineteenth and twentieth cen-
turies the guarantee of freedom of religion appears with impressive 
uniformity."74 In the Soviet Union, for example, shortly after the 
February Revolution of 1917, legal protection was accorded to free-
dom of conscience, "including the right to profess any religion or to 
profess none."75 Following the October Revolution, Lenin reaf-
firmed this right by proclaiming in January 1918, "the separation of 
the Church from the State and the School from the Church," thereby 
believe or approve; the Establishment Clause protects one against coercion to 
do even what one would want to do voluntarily and what one would approve 
if it were done freely. Taken together, their purpose is not to degrade or weaken 
religion in any respect whatsoever, but, on the contrary, as with the other guar-
antees of the First Amendment, to recognize and to implement the belief that 
"Almighty God hath created the mind free"; and that man is not man unless 
his mind remains free; and that God is not served except by a mind that is free. 
Had God wanted a coerced worship, He would have created not man but an un-
free agent; and what God did not choose to do, the government a fortiori may 
not do. 
M. KoNVITZ, ExPANDING LIBERTIES 29 (1966) (emphasis original). 
73. In his recent study, Pfeffer observes that 
on the whole the American people have been faithful to the commitment that, 
the business of God is not that of Caesar. This does not mean that there have 
been no deviations and lapses. Although the national Constitution contains no 
reference to God, practically every State Constitution does invoke His name 
(usually in the preamble) and acknowledges the people's dependence on Him. 
Christmas is a national holiday; legislatures, national and State, open their ses-
sions with prayer; prayer meetings are sporadically held in the White House; "In 
God We Trust" is to be found on the currency of the realm, and "under God" 
in our Pledge of Allegiance. These and similar instances of governmental re-
ligiosity are, however, marginal and of little significance. • . • 
L. PFEFFER, Goo, CAESAR, AND THE CONSTITUTION 345-46 (1915). 
On the general question of church and state in the United States, see S. Conn, 
THE RISE OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN AMERICA (1902); T. EMERSON, D. HABER & N, 
DORSEN, PoLmCAL AND CML RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 736-854 (student ed. 
1967); P. KAUPER, supra note 41; M. KoNVITZ, supra note 72, at 3-47; M. KoNVITZ, 
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND CONSCIENCE (1968); P. KURLAND, supra note SO; w. MAR-
NELL, THE FIRST AMENDMENT: THE HISTORY OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN AMERICA 
(1964); R MORGAN, THE SUPREME COURT AND RELIGION (1972); L. PFEFFER, 
CHURCH, STATE AND FREEDOM (rev. ed. 1967); B. SCHWARTZ, RIGHTS OF THE PERSON: 
EQUALITY, BELIEF AND DIGNITY 649-709 (1968); A. STOKES, supra note 44; A. 
STOKES & L. PFEFFER, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES (rev. ed. 1964); 
TORPEY, JUDICIAL DOCTRINES OF RELIGIOUS RIGHTS IN AMERICA (1948); Bittker, 
Churches, Taxes and the Constitution, 78 YALE LJ. 1285 (1969); Burkholder, supra 
note 38; Hollingsworth, supra note 48; Kauper, The Supreme Court and the Establish-
ment Clause: Back to Everson?, 25 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 107 (1974); Pfeffer, supra 
note 38; Pfeffer, Uneasy Trinity: Church, State, and Constitution, 2 Civ. LIBERTIES 
REv., No. 1, at 13S (1975); Schwarz, No Imposition of Religion: The Establishment 
Clause Value, 77 YALE L.J. 692 (1968). Cf. J. BENNETT, CHRISTIANS AND THE STATE 
(1958). 
74. H. LAUTERPACHT, AN INTERNATIONAL BILL OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN 10S 
(1945). For a detailed account of those constitutional provisions for religious 
liberty, see M. BATES, supra note 1, at 504-41. 
15. A. KRISHNASWAMI, supra note 1, at 6. 
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abolishing the dominance of the Orthodox Church prevailing under 
Czarist Russia and guaranteeing "the equality of all religions."76 
More recently, inspired by the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights and other related pronouncements, the constitutions of the 
newly independent states have prominently incorporated religious 
freedom and equality into the proteoted sphere of human rights.77 
The trends toward religious freedom and equality within national 
communities have not been isolated events. They have influenced 
one another and, in so doing, have brought about transnational 
expectations of religious liberty that, in turn, have strengthened na-
tional practice. Building upon the doctrine of natural rights as a 
source of transnational authority, Hugo Grotius (and other prominent 
international lawyers after him) emphasized that, in the same 
sense that international law is important to the maintenance of re-
ligious toleration, is religious toleration indispensable to a stable 
international order.78 Thus, Krishnaswami noted that, "[e]ven be-
fore the concept of freedom of thought, conscience and religion was 
recognized in national law-and partly because it had not been so 
recognized-the practice evolved of making treaty stipulations ensur-
ing certain rights to individuals or groups professing a religion or 
belief different from that of the majority in the country."79 In 1536, 
the King of France and the Ottoman Emperor concluded a treaty 
conferring various liberties, including freedom of religion, upon 
French subjects within the Ottoman territory;80 these stipulations in 
the form of "capitulations" in peace treaties "became the model for 
many later treaties of this sort as the capitulation system spread 
during the seventeenth, eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries."81 
The Treaty of Westphalia, concluded in 1648 after the Thirty Years' 
War, represented an important step toward ensuring toleration both 
for Protestants in Catholic states and for Catholics in Protestant 
states, although it fell short of affording religious freedom to all indi-
viduals and groups. 82 Another landmark was ,the Treaty of Berlin of 
1878, pursuant to which the newly established states of Bulgaria, 
Montenegro, Romania, Serbia, and the Sublime Porte (the Ottoman 
Empire) undertook to ensure religious freedom to all ·their inhabi-
76. Id. Cf. H. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 74, at 106. 
77. Cf. A. CARRILLO DE ALBORNOZ, RELIGIOUS LmER1Y 160-62 (J. Drury transl. 
1967); RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (Counci!ium. vol. 18, 1966). 
78. R. BAINTON, supra note 61, at 16-17. Cf. M. MANTON, RELIGIOUS PRO-
HmmoNS UNDER THE MEXICAN CONSTITUTION BEFORE THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND 
THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 12-28 ( 1934); R. HIGGINS, CON-
FLICT OF INTERESTS: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A DIVIDED WORLD 17-22 (1965). 
79. A. KRISHNASWAMI, supra note 1, at 11. 
80. See id.; Toth, supra note 1, at 210. 
81. A. KRISHNASWAMI, supra note 1, at 11. 
82. Id. See also C. ECKHARDT, THE PAPACY AND WORLD AFFAms: As REFLECTED 
IN THE SECULARIZATION OF POLITICS (1937). 
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tants. 83 Thus, in Tegard to Bulgaria, the Treaty provided in article 5: 
The difference of religious creeds and confessions shall not be al-
leged against any person as a ground for exclusion or incapacity in 
matters relating to the enjoyment of civil and political rights, admis-
sion to public employments, functions, and honours, or the exercise 
of the various professions and industries in any locality whatsoever. 
The freedom and outward exercise of all forms of worship are 
assured to all persons belonging to Bulgaria, as well as to foreigners, 
and no hindrance shall be offered either to the hierarchical organiza-
tion of the different communions, or to their relations with their spir-
itual chiefs. 84 
Similar provisions were incorporated in article 27 (regarding Monte-
negro), 85 article 35 (regarding Serbia),86 and article 44 (regarding 
Romania). 87 Additional obligations were imposed upon the Otto-
man Empire in article 62: 
All persons shall be admitted, without distinction of religion, to 
give evidence before the tribunals; 
Ecclesiastics, pilgrims, and monks of all nationalities travelling in 
Turkey in Europe, or in Turkey in Asia, shall enjoy the same rights, 
advantages, and privileges . . . . 
The right of official protection by the Diplomatic and Consular 
Agents of the Powers in Turkey is recognized both as regards the 
above-mentioned persons and their religious, charitable, and other es-
tablishments in the Holy Places and elsewhere . . . . 
The monks of Mount Athos, of whatever country they may be 
natives, shall be maintained in their former possessions and advan-
tages, and shall enjoy, without exception, complete equality of rights 
and prerogatives. 88 
Those peace treaties containing provisions regarding religious 
freedom, from 1648 (Westphalia) to 1878 (Berlin), shared an over-
riding concern: the protection of religious minorities by guaranteeing 
freedom of conscience and religion. 89 It was this same concern that 
inspired the early development of the doctrines and practices of hu-
manitarian intervention in customary international law. In the words 
of Ganji: 
The history of international protection of Minorities to the early 
part of the 20th Century is that of the international protection of 
religious Minorities. If not all, the greater part of the history of hu-
manitarian intervention is the history of intervention on behalf of per-
83. The text of the Treaty of Berlin, signed on July 13, 1878, is reprinted in 2 
KEY TREATIES FOR THE GREAT POWERS 1814-1914, at 551-77 (M. Hurst ed. 1972). 
84. Id. at 555-56. 
85. Id. at 564. 
86. Id. at 567. 
81. Id. at 570-71. 
88. Id. at 575. 
89. See M. BATES, supra note 1, at 477-84. 
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secuted religious minorities. These interventions were as a rule ini-
tiated by states whose people were linked by ties of religious belief 
to the persecuted minorities of the state intervened against. As far 
back as the latter part of the 17th Century there is, in the history 
of international relations, evidence of international protection of re-
ligious minorities undertaken by the European Powers. 90 
In addition to inserting provisos into peace treaties, states have 
often inserted provisions guaranteeing religious freedom into bilateral 
treaties of amity, commerce, and navigation.91 This type of protec-
tion was particularly favored by Great Britain and the United States. 
For example, in order to ensure religious freedom for Americans 
abroad, the United States included such protective clauses in the 
treaties of friendship and commerce with The Netherlands (1782), 
with Sweden (1783), and with Prussia (1785).92 Article 9 of the 
treaty with Prussia stipulated: "The most perfect freedom of con-
science and of worship is granted to the citizens: or subjects of 
either party within ithe jurisdiotion of the other, without being liable to 
molestation in that respect for any other cause than an insult on the 
religion of others."93 Comparable protection against religious dis-
crimination was provided for in the bilateral treaties concluded by the 
United States with, respectively, China, Japan, Siam, the Congo, 
Germany, Ecuador, Honduras, Austria, Norway, Poland, Finland, 
Liberia, and Iraq.94 The protection offered by these treaties was 
"reciprocal" and extensive, providing for "freedom of public worship, 
with due reservation of proper requirements, for foreigners to enjoy 
the same rights and benefits as nationals, including residence, travel, 
and the right to hold property for religious purposes, with express or 
implied right to conduct religious, educational, and philanthropic 
work."95 
Transnational efforts toward eliminating religious discrimination 
were fortified with the establishment of the League of Nations. The 
Covenant of the League, in article 22(5), held a Mandatory 
"responsible for the administration of the territory under conditions 
which will guarantee freedom of conscience and religion."96 Thus, 
90. M. GANJI, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 17 (1962) (foot-
note omitted). For further details, see id. at 17-44. 
91. See M. BATES, supra note 1, at 477-87, 542-43; R. WILSON, UNITED STATES 
COMMERCIAL TREATIES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 244-79 (1960). 
92. M. BATES, supra note 1, at 485. 
93. Quoted in id. at 485-86. 
94. Id. at 479, 486. 
95. Id. at 486. Cf. R. HIGGINS, supra note 78, at 23-39. 
96. The mandate system of the League was designed, at the end of World War I, 
to detach the territories of the defeated powers (i.e., Turkish territories and the 
German colonies in Africa and Oceania) and to entrust them to mandatory powers. 
For further details and subsequent development, see N. BENTWICH, THE MANDATES 
SYSTEM (1930); R. CHoWDHURI, INTERNATIONAL MANDATES AND TRUSTEESHIP SY-
STEMS (1955); LEAGUE OF NATIONS, THE MANDATE SYSTEM (1945); A. MARGALITH, 
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article 1 of the French Mandate for Togoland (or the Cameroons) 
(Class B) stipulated: 
The Mandatory shall ensure in the territory complete freedom of con-
science and the free exercise of all forms of worship, which are con-
sonant with public order and morality; missionaries who are nationals 
of States Members of the League of Nations shall be free to enter 
the territory and to travel and reside therein, to acquire and possess 
property, to erect religious buildings, and to open schools throughout 
the territory; it being understood, however, that the Mandatory shall 
have the right to exercise such control as may be necessary for the 
maintenance of public order and good government, and to take all 
measures required for such control. 97 
Similarly, the South African Mandate for South-West Africa (Class 
C) provided: 
Subject to the provisions of any local law for the maintenance of pub-
lic order and public morals, the Mandatory shall ensure in the terri-
tory freedom of conscience and the free exercise of all forms of wor-
ship, and shall allow all missionaries, nationals of any State Member 
of the League of Nations, to enter into, travel and reside in the terri-
tory for the purpose of prosecuting their calling. 98 
Further important efforts to advance the goal of religious freedom 
were made under League auspices through the international regime of 
minority protection. Religious minorities were among the minority 
groups that the League of Nations was empowered to protect.00 In 
post-World War I arrangements (effected through both treaty stipula-
tions and League resolutions), designed by the League to shelter 
minority groups from discrimination and oppression, a profound 
concern was manifested for religious freedom. The Treaty with 
Poland, signed at Versailles on June 28, 1919,100 served as a proto-
type for comparable arrangements with a number of other states 
including Czechoslovakia, the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, Romania, 
Greece, Austria, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Turkey (through treaty 
THE INTERNATIONAL MANDATES (1930); J. MURRAY, THE UNITED NATIONS TRUSTEE· 
SHIP SYSTEM (1957); 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 212-42 (8th ed. H. 
Lauterpacht 1955); L. SOHN & T. BUERGENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OP 
HUMAN RIGHTS 337-504 (1973); C. TOUSSAINT, THE TRUSTEESHIP OF THE UNITED 
NATIONS (1956); E. VAN MANNEN-HELMER, THE MANDATES SYSTEM IN RELATION TO 
AFRICA AND THE PACIFIC ISLANDS (1929); Q. WRIGHT, MANDATES UNDER THB LEAGUE 
OF NATIONS (1930). See generally Chen, Self-Determination as a Human Right, in 
TOWARD WORLD ORDER AND HUMAN DIGNITY (W. Reisman & B. Weston eds. 
forthcoming). 
97. Quoted in Bates, supra note 1, at 488. 
98. Reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OP HUMAN 
RIGHTS 242, 244 (L. Sohn & T. Buergenthal eds. 1973) [hereinafter BASIC 
DOCUMENTS] (art. 5). 
99. See McDougal, Lasswell & Chen, supra note 47, at 1054-56. 
100. Reprinted in LEAGUE OP NATIONS, PROTECTION OF LINGUISTIC, RACIAL AND 
RELIGIOUS MINORITIES BY THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS, 1927 J.B. 2, at 41-45. 
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stipulation) and Albania, Esthonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Iraq 
(through League resolutions).101 
A close examination of the provisions of the treaty with Poland 
documents the deep demand existing at that time for protection 
against religious discrimination. Article 2 of the treaty obliged Po-
land to "assure full and complete protection of life and liberty" to all 
of its inhabitants "without distinction" as to "religion" or other fac-
tors.102 The same article afforded more general protection: "All 
inhabitants of Poland shall be entitled to the free exercise, whether 
public or private, of any creed, religion, or belief, whose practices are 
not inconsistent with public order or public morals."103 "All Polish 
nationals," according to article 7, "shall be equal before the law and 
shall enjoy the same civil and political rights without distinction as to 
race, language or religion."104 "Differences of religion, creed or 
confession," the article added, "shall not prejudice any Polish national 
in matters relating to the enjoyment of civil or political rights, as for 
instance admission to public employments, functions and honours, or 
the exercise of professions and industries."105 Finally, article 8 
provided: 
Polish nationals who belong to racial, religious or linguistic minorities 
shall enjoy the same treatment and security in law and in fact as the 
other Polish nationals. In particular they shall have an equal right 
to establish, manage and control at their own expense charitable, re-
ligious educational establishments, with the right to use their own lan-
guage and to exercise their religion freely therein.106 
All of these provisions were recognized under article 1, as "funda-
mental laws" and, hence, the treaty stipulated that "no law, regulation 
or official action shall conflict or interfere with these stipulations, nor 
shall any law, regulation or official action prevail over them."107 
Furthermore, these duties were, pursuant to article 12, made "obliga-
tions of international concern" and placed "under the guarantee of 
the League of Nations."108 
The contemporary proscription against religious discrimination, 
like comparable proscriptions concerning race and sex, 109 is firmly 
established in the Charter of the United Nations and has been further 
amplified in related human rights instruments. In the Charter provi-
101. See id. 
102. Id. at 43. 
103. Id. 
104. Id. 
105. Id. When people are deprived of the opportunity to become nationals 
because of religious beliefs, however, such a provision is futile. 
106. Id. at 44. 
107. Id. at 42. 
108. Id. at 44. 
109. See McDougal, Lasswell & Chen, supra note 47, at 1042-86; McDougal, 
Lasswell & Chen, Human Rights for Women and World Public Order: The Outlawing 
of Sex-Based Discrimination, 69 AM. J. INTL. L. 497 (1975). 
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sions concerning discrimination, religion is consistently specified, 
along with race, sex, and language, as an impermissible ground of 
differentiation.11° At the San Francisco Conference of 1945, it was 
proposed (notably by Latin American delegations) that detailed 
guarantees of freedom of conscience and religion be incorporated in 
the Charter; however, these proposals were not accepted.111 In-
stead, by repeatedly employing the familiar formula of "human rights 
and fundamental freedom~ for all, without distinction as to race, sex, 
language or religion,"112 the Charter established a more general 
norm prohibiting discrimination. This policy was first implemented 
in the post-World War II peace treaties concluded in 1947 by the 
Allied Powers with Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, Italy, and Romania. 
Each state pledged to undertake "all measures necessary to secure 
to all persons under [its] jurisdiction, without distinction as to race, 
sex, language or religion, the enjoyment of human rights and of the 
fundamental freedoms, including freedom . . . of religious worship. 
"113 
In attempting to explicate the Charter's comprehensive prohibi-
tion of discrimination, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in 
article 2, specifies religion as among the impermissible grounds of 
differentiation.114 This general prohibition of discrimination is made 
more explicit in article 18: 
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and re-
ligion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and 
freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or 
private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, wor-
ship or observance.115 
Article 1, by proclaiming that all human beings are "endowed with 
reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit 
of brotherhood,"116 further affirms the right of the individual to 
explore and define a personal orientation toward other persons and 
the universe. In order to implement this aspiration, article 26(2) 
110. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 3; art. 13, para l(b); art. 55(c); art. 62, para. 2; 
art. 76(c). 
111. A. KruSHNASWAMI, supra note 1, at 12. 
112. See Charter provisions cited in note 110 supra. 
113. Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria, Feb. 10, 1947, art 2, No. 643, 41 U.N.T.S. 
21; Treaty of Peace with Hungary, Feb. 10, 1947, art. 2, No. 644, 41 U.N.T.S. 135; 
Treaty of Peace with Romania, Feb. 10, 1947, art. 3, No. 645, 42 U.N.T.S. 3; Treaty 
of Peace with Finland, Feb. 10, 1947, art. 6, No. 746, 48 U.N.T.S. 203. See also 
Treaty of Peace with Italy, Feb. 10, 1947, art. 19(4), No. 747, 49 U.N.T.S. 3 (with a 
slight variation in wording from the preceding provisions). 
114. G.A. Resolution 217A(Ill), U.N. GAOR pt. 1, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948), 
reprinted in UNITED NATIONS, HUMAN RIGHTS: A COMPILATION OF INTERNATIONAL 
INSTRUMENTS OF nm UNITED NATIONS 1, U.N. Doc. ST/HR/1 (1973) [hereinafter 
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urges that education be directed to "promote understanding, toler-
ance and friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups."117 
Important protection for religious groups can also be found in a 
number of relatively recent conventions, including the Genocide Con-
vention of 1948.118 This convention seeks "to prevent and to pun-
ish" certain acts "committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in 
part," religious groups, among others; the acts prohibited include 
"killing members of the group," causing members of a protected 
group "serious bodily or mental harm," deliberate infliction of living 
conditions calculated to bring about group destruction, "measures 
intended to prevent births within the group," and forcible transfer of 
children.119 The convention also punishes "conspiracy," "incite-
ment," "attempt to commit," and "complicity in genocide.m2o Both 
the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (1951) and the 
Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons (1954) protect 
refugees and stateless persons from religious discrimination and ac-
cord them "national treatment" with regard to "freedom to practice 
their religion and freedom as regards the religious education of their 
children."121 The Discrimination (Employment and Occupation). 
Convention of 1958, which aspires to bring about "equality of oppor-
tunity of treatment in employment or occupation," includes religion 
among the prohibited grounds of differentiation.122 Similarly, the 
Convention against Discrimination in Education of 1960, designed to 
ensure "equality of opportunity and treatment for all in education," 
specifically prohibits discrimination on the basis of religion.123 
In the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
adopted by the General Assembly in 1966 (taking effect on March 
23, 1976), religion is included in both the general provision against 
discrimination in the enjoyment of all human rights under article 
118. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 
opened for signature Dec. 9, 1948, No. 1021, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, reprinted in U.N. 
HUMAN RIGIITS INSTRUMENTS, supra note 114, at 41. 
119. Id. 
120. Id. 
121. Article 3 provides that "[t]he Contracting States shall apply the provisions 
of this Convention to refugees without discrimination as to race, religion or 
country of origin," and article 4 reads: ''The Contracting States shall accord to 
refugees within their territories treatment at least as favourable as that accorded 
to their nationals with respect to freedom to practice their religion and free-
dom as regards the religious education of their children." Convention relating to 
the Status of Stateless Persons, Sept. 9, 1954, No. 5158, 360 U.N.T.S. 130, reprinted 
in U.N. HUMAN RIGIITS !N5I"RUMENTS, supra note 114, at 61. Comparable provisions 
are found in articles 3 and 4 of the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, 
July 28, 1951, No. 254, 189 U.N.T.S. 150, reprinted in U.N. HUMAN Rimrrs 
!N5I"RUMENTS, supra, at 68. 
122. Convention concerning Discrimination in respect to Employment and Occu-
pation, June 25, 1958, No. 5181, 362 U.N.T.S. 31, reprinted in U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS 
lN5I"RUMENTS, supra note 114, at 29. 
123. Dec. 14, 1960, No. 6193, 429 U.N.T.S. 93, reprinted in U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS 
INSTRUMENTS, supra note 114, at 31. 
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2(1)124 and in the equal protection clause under article 26.125 The 
prohibition of discrimination is regarded as of such overriding im-
portance that states are forbidden to practice discrimination on the 
ground of religion (or on the ground of race, color, sex, language, or 
social origin) where derogations from their obligations would other-
wise be justified by "public emergency" under article 4(1).128 In 
article 18(1), the basic content of the right so emphatically protected 
is defined by prescribing complete freedom of choice regarding recti-
tude: ''Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, con-
science and religion. This right shall include freedom to have or -to 
adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and freedom, either individu-
ally or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest 
his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teach-
ing. "127 Article 18(2) further insulates this right by providing pro-
tection against coercion that would "impair" an individual's "freedom 
to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice."128 Article 
18(3) then expresses the recognition that this freedom, like other 
rights, is subject to the necessity of appropriate accommodation with 
the aggregate common interest.129 In addition, article 24(1) pro-
vides that the special protection accorded to children is to be effected 
without discrimination on account of religion, 130 and article 27 spe-
cifically includes religious minorities among the protected minority 
groups.1a1 
Similarly, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights (adopted by the General Assembly in 1966 and 
124. G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 
reprinted in U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS, supra note 114, at 8. 
125. Id. 
126. Article 4(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
reads: 
In time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the exist-
ence of which is officially proclaimed, the States Parties to the present Covenant 
may take measures derogating from their obligations under the present Covenant 
to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that 
such measures are not inconsistent with their other obligations under interna-
tional law and do not involve discrimination solely on the ground of race, colour, 




129. Article 18(3) reads: "Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs may be 
subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect 
public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of 
others." Id. 
130. Article 24(1) provides: "Every child shall have, without any discrimination 
as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, national or social origin, property or birth, 
the right to such measures of protection as are required by his status as a minor, on 
the part of his family, society and the State." Id. 
131. Article 27 stipulates: "In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic 
minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in 
community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to 
profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own language." Id. 
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becoming operative on January 3, 1976) contains, in article 2(2), a 
comprehensive guarantee that the rights stipulated in the covenant 
will be exercised without discrimination on the ground of religion.132 
Article 13(1) amplifies this guarantee by proclaiming that education 
be directed to "enable all persons to participate effectively in a free 
society, promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all 
nations and all racial, ethnic or religious groups."133 It may be 
recalled, finally, that the Proclamation of Teheran of 1968 insists that 
it is "imperative that the members of the international community 
fulfill their solemn obligations to promote and encourage respect for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinctions 
of any kind," including "religion."134 
Both the continuing demand for more tightly articulated interna-
tional prescriptions to ensure religious freedom and the difficulty 
involved in formulating such prescriptions are demonstrated by the 
efforts within the United Nations to formulate a convention and a 
declaration on elimination of all forms of religious intolerance. At 
its seventeenth session in 1962, the General Assembly (in response to 
recurring manifestations of anti-Semitism and other forms of racial 
and religious prejudice) decided to formulate a declaration and a 
convention on "the elimination of all forms of religious intolerance," 
paralleling a set of instruments on "the elimination of all forms of 
racial discrimination."135 Although the Declaration and the Conven-
tion on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination were 
successively adopted by the General Assembly in 1963 and in 1965 
(the latter taking effect on January 4, 1969),136 the contemplated 
declaration and convention on the elimination of religious intolerance 
are yet to be completed. This "marked contrast," characterized by 
"the stormy course of the instruments dealing with religious intoler-
ance,"137 has been caused by a coalition of delegations seeking to 
downplay the issues of anti-Semitism and other forms of religious 
intolerance.138 Religious warfare, it would appear, is not entirely an 
132. G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 
reprinted in U.N. HUMAN RIGIITS INSTRUMENTS, supra note 114, at 3. 
133. Id. 
134. U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 32/41 (1968), reprinted in U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS 
INSTRUMENTS, supra note 114, at 18. 
135. See McDougal, Lasswell & Chen, supra note 47, at 1058-60. 
136. Id. 
137. Liskofsky, Eliminating Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion or 
Belief: The U.N. Role, REPORTS ON nm FOREIGN SCENE, Feb. 1968, No. 8, at 1, 3. 
138. See McDougal, Lasswell & Chen, supra note 47, at 1058-60 • . See also 
Liskofsky, supra note 137, at 3-4. · 
For the legislative history of the proposed declaration and the proposed conven-
tion on the elimination of religious intolerance and discrimination, see Manifestations 
of Racial Prejudice and National and Religious Intolerance (Report of the Secretary-
General), U.N. Doc. A/6347 (1966); Elimination of All Forms of Religious Intoler-
ance (Note by the Secretary-General), U.N. Doc. A/7177 (1968); Elimination of All 
Forms of Religious Intolerance (Note by the Secretary-General), U.N. Doc. A/7930 
888 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 74:865 
affair of the past. In 1964 (two years after the Assembly's decision 
to formulate a declaration and a convention), the Sub-Commission 
on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities submit-
ted a preliminary draft declaration139 to the Commission on Human 
Rights, which, through a fifteen-member Working Group, was able to 
agree only upon six of the proposed articles. 140 After reporting this 
outcome to the Assembly through the Economic and Social Council 
and seeking further instructions, 141 the Commission began preparing 
a draft convention. 
In 1965, the Sub-Commission presented a preliminary draft con-
vention to the Commission.142 Building upon the Sub-Commission's 
draft, the Commission, at its sessions from 1965 to 1967, adopted a 
preamble and twelve articles but was unable ,to consider the proposed 
articles on measures of implementation.143 The Commission's draft 
convention, together with other related proposals not considered by 
the Commission, was transmitted to the General Assembly in 1967 by 
the Economic and Social Council; the Council also expressed the 
hope that the Assembly would decide on appropriate implementation 
provisions.144 The Assembly considered the draft convention at its 
twenty-second session in 1967 and decided to change its title to draft 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Intoler-
ance and of Discrimination based on Religion or Belief ;145 however, 
since the 1967 session, the Assembly has deferred consideration of 
the draft convention. 
In December 1972, the Assembly decided to "accord priority to 
the completion of the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of 
(1970); Elimination of All Forms of Religious Intolerance (Note by the Secretary-
General), U.N. Doc. A/8330 (1971) [hereinafter U.N. Doc. A/8330]; Elimination 
of All Forms of Religious Intolerance (Report of the Third Committee), U.N. Doc. 
A 9322 (1973); Draft Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Religious 
Intolerance (Working Paper prepared by the Secretariat), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1145 
(1973 ). 
139. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, REPORT ON nm TwENTIETII SESSION, 37 
U.N. ECOSOC, Supp. 8, at 69-74, U.N. Doc. E/3873 (E/CN.4/874) (1964). The 
full text of the preliminary draft of a "United Nations Declaration on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Religious Intolerance, Prepared by the Sub-Commission on Preven-
tion of Discriminaiton and Protection of Minorities" [hereinafter Sub-Commission 
Draft Declaration] is conveniently attached as an annex to U.N. Doc. A/8330, supra 
note 138. 
140. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 139, at 74-81; U.N. Doc, 
A/8330, supra note 138, at 4. The text of the articles as prepared by the Working 
Group [hereinafter Working Group Draft Declaration] is attached as an annex. to 
U.N. Doc. A/8330, supra. 
141. U.N. Doc. A/8330, supra note 138, at 4-5. 
142. Id. at 5. The draft convention [hereinafter Commission Draft Convention] 
is also attached as an annex to U.N. Doc. A/8330. 
143. Id. at 6. 
144. ECOSOC Res. 1233, 42 U.N. ECOSOC, Supp. 1, at 13, U.N. Doc. E/4393 
(1967). 
145. U.N. Doc. A/8330, supra note 138, at 7. 
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Religious Intolerance before resuming consideration of the Interna-
tional Convention on this subject."146 The Assembly instructed that 
the drafts previously prepared in 1964 by the Sub-Commission and 
the Working Group of the Commission on Human Rights be circu-
lated to member states and specialized agencies for comments.147 It 
further urged "the adoption, if possible, of such a Declaration as part 
of the observance of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights" in 1973.148 Yet, in 1973, the task 
remained unfinished and its consideration took a new tum. While 
reaffirming the priority accorded to the "completion of the Declara-
tion," in December of 1973, the Assembly indicated that "the prepa-
ration of a draft Declaration" required "additional study." Accord-
ingly, it instructed the Commission on Human Rights to "submit, if 
possible, a single draft Declaration to the Assembly at its twenty-ninth 
session" in 1974 in the light of the suggestions, comments, and 
amendments recently received.149 The Commission was, however, 
nowhere near the completion of its newly assigned task at its thirtieth 
and thirty-first sessions held in 1974 and 1975.150 In view of the 
slow progress within the Commission, it is unclear when the draft 
declaration will be completed and adopted by the General Assembly; 
moreover, completion of the draft convention appears to be even a 
more remote possibility. 
Despite the delay in their completion and adoption, the contours 
of :the proposed declaration and ·the proposed convention have been 




149. G. A. Res. 3069, 28 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 30, at 77-78, U.N. Doc. A/9030 
(1973). See also G. A. Res. 3267, 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 31, at 88-89, U.N. Doc. 
A/9631 (1975); Elimination of All Forms of Religious Intolerance (Report of the 
Third Committee), U.N. Doc. A/9893 (1974). 
For recent comments by various governments, see Draft Declaration on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Religious Intolerance (Report of the Secretary General), 
U.N. Doc. A/9134 (1973); Analytical presentation of the observations received from 
Governments concerning the draft Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Religious Intolerance (Note by the Secretary-General), U.N. Doc. A/9135 (1973); 
Draft Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Religious Intolerance (Report 
of the Secretary-General), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1146 (1974). 
150. Commission on Human Rights, Report on the Thirtieth Session (4 Feb.-8 
March 1974), 56 U.N. ECOSOC Supp. 5, at 7, 18-22, 57, U.N. Doc. E/5464 
(E/CN.4/1154) (1974). After considerable debate in its Thirtieth Session in 1974 
about ways and means of accelerating the preparation of a single draft declaration, 
the Commission has set up "an informal Working Group open to all members of the 
Commission." Id. at 19. The informal Working Group, with Mr. Pierre Juvigny 
(France) serving as Chairman-Rapporteur, agreed to proceed on the basis of "consen-
sus," and was able to consider only "the title and the first two preambular paragraphs 
of a draft Declaration" in the six meetings it held in February 1974. 
For an account of the limited progress made in 1975, see Commission on Human 
Rights, Report on the Thirty-First Session (3 Feb.-7 March 1975), 58 U.N. ECOSOC 
Supp. 4, at 4, 36-41, U.N. Doc. E/5635 (E/CN.4/1179) (1975). 
890 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 74:865 
sufficiently articulated in the available drafts to make it possible to 
anticipate :their ultimate form. Taken together, the respective drafts 
of the declaration proposed by the Sub-Commission151 and the Work-
ing Group of the Commission on Human Rights, 152 along with the 
draft convention prepared by the Commission, 153 appear to parallel 
ithe Declaration and the Convention on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination. This parallelism is observable in proposed provi-
sions concerning the grounds of differentiation prohibited, the rights 
protected, the specific acts forbidden, and the actors precluded from 
engaging in discrimination.154 
Discrimination on the ground of religion or belief is condemned 
as an "offence to human dignity," "a denial of the principles of the 
Charter of the United Nations," "a violation of the human rights and 
fundamental freedoms proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights," and "an obstacle to friendly and peaceful relations 
among nations."155 In terms as broad and inclusive as those used in 
the racial convention, the draft convention defines "discrimination on 
the ground of religion or belier' to mean "any distinction, exclusion, 
restriction or preference based on religion or belief which has the 
purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoy-
ment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and funda-
mental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, or any 
other field of public life."156 The terms "religion or belief" are 
defined as including "theistic, non-theistic, and atheistic beliefs."157 
In recognition of the "complexities of the issues involved in the 
elaboration of standards for religious liberty in a world community of 
diverse beliefs and institutions,"158 article 1(4) of the draft conven-
tion adds: ''Neither the establishment of a religion nor the recogni-
tion of a religion or belief by a State nor the separation of Church 
from State shall by itself be considered religious intolerance or dis-
crimination on the ground of religion or belief."100 This provision 
appears to be an unfortunate departure from the conventional wisdom 
that the establishment or recognition of an official religion may 
promote intolerance of other beliefs.160 
151. Sub-Commission Draft Declaration, supra note 139. 
152. Working Group Draft Declaration, supra note 140. 
153. Commission Draft Convention, supra note 142. 
154. See McDougal, Lasswell & Chen, supra note 47, at 1060-72. 
155. Sub-Commission Draft Declaration, supra note 139, art. 1, at 2; Working 
Group Draft Declaration, supra note 140, art. 2, at 2. 
156. Commission Draft Convention, supra note 142, art. l(b), at 2. 
157. Commission Draft Convention, supra note 142, art. l(a). 
158. Abram, supra note 1, at 46. 
159. Commission Draft Convention, supra note 142, art. l(d), at 2. 
160. In the words of Krishnaswami: 
For centuries. a close relationship existed in almost all countries between the 
State and the predominant religion. This religion enjoyed a special status, either 
because it had been recognized as the Established Church or because it had been 
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The drafts of both the convention and the declaration contem-
plate comprehensive protection against religious discrimination. Thus, 
the drafts speak in terms of protecting all of the "political, civic, 
economic, social and cultural rights"161 and "human rights and fun-
damental freedoms" in "any other field of public life."162 In the 
course of considering which rights should be protected by the pro-
posed instruments, however, a fundamental issue has been "whether 
to deal only with discrimination based on religion or belief, e.g. in 
employment, education, housing or citizenship, or, in addition, with 
the 'freedom' of all to practice and manifest religion and belief."163 
The response has thus far been in favor of the latter position; this 
position appears to recognize that, in order to eliminate religious 
intolerance and discrimination, it is essential to "keep fully in the 
forefront the substance of the right to freedom of thought, conscience 
and religion."164 "What would be the meaning of tolerance," it has 
been asked, "without the affirmation of the rich substance of the 
right, which all should be free to exercise?"165 Hence, both the draft 
declaration and the draft convention make elaborate and detailed 
provision for "the right to freedom of thought, conscience, religion or 
belier' as the core freedom, indispensable to the achievement of an 
environment free from discrimination on account of religion or belief. 
This core freedom, to be extended to everyone, includes: 
(1) Freedom to adhere or not to adhere to any religion or belief 
and to change his religion or belief in accordance with the dic-
tates of his conscience . . . . 
accepted as the State religion. Not infrequently recognition of the predominant 
religion led to the total exclusion of all other religions, or at least to their reduc-
tion to a subordinate position. Thus in the past the mere existence in a country 
of an Established Church or of a State religion usually connoted severe discrimi-
nation-and sometimes even outright persecution--directed against dissenters. 
A. KRrsHNASWAMI, supra note 1, at 46. Commenting on this conventional wisdom, 
he cautioned readers today not to jump to such an inference without a thorough 
contextual scrutiny. Id. at 46-54. 
In the same vein, Abram has explained: 
Member States include those in which there is complete separation of Church 
and State, those in which several religions are recognized by the State, and those 
with a single Established Church or State religion. While it has often been ar-
gued that a particular juridical relationship logically determines a potential pat-
tern of infringement of the rights of minority religions or beliefs, it seems diffi-
cult to confirm this argument in practice. . • . 
The moral of these examples is easily drawn: the determinants of the re-
ligious freedom of a society include not only the juridical framework and the 
laws of the State but also the mores of the society, including the value placed 
upon this freedom by the major religions and ideologies within the society. 
Abram, supra note 1, at 46-47. 
161. Commission Draft Convention, supra note 142, art. 5, at 4. See also 
Working Group Draft Declaration, supra note 140, art. 4(1), at 2. 
162. Commission Draft Convention, supra note 142, art. l(b), at 2. 
163. Liskofsky, supra note 137, at 3. 
164. Observations made by the Commission of the Churches on International 
Affairs to the Sub-Commission's Draft Declaration, reprinted in A. CARRILLO DE 
ALBORNOZ, RELIGIOUS llBER1Y 32, 33 (1964). 
165. Id. 
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(2) Freedom to manifest his religion or belief either alone or in 
community with others, and in public or in private . . . . 
(3) Freedom to express opinion on questions concerning a re-
ligion or belief. 
( 4) Freedom to worship, to hold assemblies related to religion or 
belief. ... 
(5) Freedom to teach, to disseminate and to learn his religion 
or belief .... 
(6) Freedom to practise his religion or belief by establishing and 
maintaining charitable and educational institutions . . . . 
(7) Freedom to observe the rituals, dietary and other practices 
of his religion or belief . . . . 
(8) Freedom to make pilgrimages and other journeys in connec-
tion with his religion or belief. . . . 
(9) Equal legal protection for the places of worship or assembly, 
the rites, ceremonies and activities, and the places of disposal 
of the dead associated with his religion or belief; 
(10) Freedom to organize and maintain local, regional, national 
and international associations in connexion with his religion or 
belief .... 
(11) Freedom from compulsion to take an oath of a religious na-
ture.1aa 
The particular acts that would be prohibited by the draft conven-
tion and the draft declaration include "any distinction, exclusion, 
restriction or preference" that "has the purpose or effect of nullifying 
or impairing" equality in "recognition, enjoyment or exercise" of 
protected rights.167 The fourfold characterizations of "distinction, 
exclusion, restriction or preference" are sufficiently broad to encom-
pass a wide range of activities.168 In addition, criminal sanctions 
would be imposed for "[a]ny aot of violence against the adherents 
of any religion or belief or against the means used for its practice, any 
incitement to such acts or incitement to hatred likely to result in acts 
of violence against any religion or belief or its adherents,"169 and "all 
propaganda designed to foster or justify" such activities.170 
166. Commission Draft Convention, supra note 142, art. 3, at 2-3. See also Sub-
Commission Draft Declaration, supra note 139, art. 6, at 3-4; Working Group Draft 
Declaration, supra note 140, art. 6, at 3. 
A further protection concerns the right of parents or legal guardians to bring up 
their children in the religion or belief of their choice and their responsibility to 
inculcate in their children tolerance for the religion of others. States would further 
be obliged not to discriminate "in the granting of subsidies, in taxation or in 
exemptions from taxation, between different religions or beliefs or their adherents." 
Sub-Commission Draft Declaration, supra note 139, arts. 5, 12, at 2, 4. See also 
Working Group Draft Declaration, supra note 140, art. 5, at 3; Commission Draft 
Convention, supra note 142, art 4, at 3-4. 
167. Commission Draft Convention, supra note 142, art. l(b), at 2. 
168. See McDougal, Lasswell & Chen, supra note 47, at 1068-71. 
169. Commission Draft Convention, supra note 142, art. 9, at 5. 
170. Sub-Commisssion Draft Declaration, supra note 139, art. 14(2), at 5. 
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In their efforts to secure the elimination of religious intolerance 
and discrimination, the proposed drafts would, like the Declaration 
and the Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 
bring both official and nonofficial actors within their authority: ''No 
States, institution, group or individual" would be permitted to "make 
any discrimination in matters of human rights and fundamental free-
doms in the treatment of persons on the grounds of their religion or 
their belief."171 These drafts also underscore the critical importance 
of intra-national action to bring about the necessary internal changes 
in both authoritative and effective power processes that would ensure 
the maintenance of the freedoms sought to bei promoted by the 
drafts.172 The drafts manifest, finally, a deep realization of the 
necessity of an appropriate accommodation of the rights and free-
doms to be enjoyed by individuals with the aggregate common inter-
est.11a 
171. Id. art. 2, at 2. See also Working Group Draft Declaration, supra note 140, 
art. 3(1), at 2. 
172. Commission Draft Convention, supra note 142, art. 6, provides: 
States Parties undertake to adopt immediate and effective measures, particularly 
in the fields of teaching, education, culture and information, with a view to com-
bating prejudices as, for example, anti-Semitism and other manifestations which 
lead to religious intolerance and to discrimination on the ground of religion or 
belief, and to promoting and encouraging, in the interest of universal peace, un-
derstanding, tolerance, co-operation and friendship among nations, groups and 
individuals, irrespective of differences in religion or belief, in accordance with 
the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and this Convention. 
Article 7 would oblige contracting states to 
take effective measures to prevent and eliminate discrimination on the ground 
of religion or belief, including the enactment or abrogation of laws OF regulations 
where necessary to prohibit such discrimination by any person, group or organ-
ization, [and not to] pursue any policy or enact or retain laws or regulations 
restricting or impeding freedom of conscience, religion or belief or the free and 
open exercise thereof, nor discriminate against any person, group or organization 
on account of membership or non-membership in, practice or non-practice of, 
or adherence or non-adherence to any religion or belief. 
Moreover, article 10 reads: 
State Parties shall ensure to everyone within their jurisdiction effective protec-
tion and remedies, through the competent national tribunals and other State in-
stitutions, against any acts, including acts of discrimination on the ground of re-
ligion or belief, which violate his human rights and fundamental freedoms con-
trary to this Convention, as well as the right to seek from such tribunals just 
and adequate reparation or satisfaction for any damage suffered as a result of 
such acts. 
See also Sub-Commission Draft Declaration, supra note 139, arts. 3(2), 14, at 2, 5; 
Working Group Draft Declaration, supra note 140, arts. 3(2), at 2. 
173. The Commission Draft Convention, supra note 142, provides: 
11. Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as giving to any person, 
group, organization or institution the right to engage in activities aimed at 
prejudicing national security, friendly relations between nations or the pur-
poses and principles of the United Nations. 
12. Nothing in this Convention shall be construed to preclude a State Party 
from prescribing by law such limitations as are necessary to protect public 
safety, order, health or moral or the individual rights and freedoms of oth-
ers, or the general welfare in a democratic society. 
Article 13(2) of the Sub-Commission Draft Declaration, supra note 139, reads: 
The freedoms aI}d. rights set _out elsewhere in this Declaration shall be subject 
only to the restnctions prescnbed by law solely for the purpose of securing due 
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On the regional level, the principle of religious freedom is embod-
ied both in general prescriptions banning discrimination that include 
religion as a prohibited ground of differentiation and in more particu-
lar prescriptions that give substance to the freedom of thought, con-
science, and religion. Thus, the European Convention on Human 
Rights includes religion, in article 14, as among the impermissible 
grounds of differentiation174 and spells out the content of freedom of 
religion in article 9.175 Similarly, the American Declaration of the 
Rights and Duties of Man176 proclaims, in art:iole 2, that "[a]ll 
persons are equal before the law and have the rights and duties 
established in this Declaration, without distinction as to race, sex, 
language, creed or any other factor." Article 1(1) of the American 
Convention on Human Rights177 expressly forbids discrimination on 
account of religion, and this general principle is reinforced by the 
equal protection clause of article 24; furthermore, article 27(1) 
provides that a state may not take measures that involve religious 
discrimination, even during a national emergency. The provision on 
the freedom of thought, conscience, and religion is found in article 
12, which (like article 9 of the European Convention) employs 
wording essentially similar to that contained in article 18 of the 
Universal Declaration and of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights.178 
In addition to the prescriptions emanating from secular sources, it 
is relevant to note that the fundamental philosophy of the world's 
great religions has increasingly exhibited support (including fewer 
demands for religious exclusivity and intolerance) for the principle of 
freedom of choice about religion.179 The principle of religious toler-
ance and freedom has become so deeply ingrained, both in the secular 
and nonsecular worlds, that a number of the great religions have 
recently issued manifestos in favor of religious freedom. The thrust 
of this new global movement is powerfully demonstrated by the 
Declaration on Religious Freedom, adopted by the Vatican TI Council 
recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting 
the legitimate requirements of morality, health, public order and the general wel-
fare in a democratic society. Any restrictions which may be imposed shall be 
consistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations and with the 
rights and freedoms stated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
These freedoms and rights may in no case be exercised contrary to the purposes 
and principles of the United Nations. 
174. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
Nov. 4, 1950, reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 98, at 125. 
115. Id. 
116. Reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 98, at 187. 
177. Reprinted in id. at 210. 
118. See text at notes 115, 127-29 supra. 
119. See A. CARRILLO DE .ALBORNOZ, supra note 77; L. JANSSENS, FREEDOM OF 
CONSCIENCE AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (Lorenzo transl. 1966); RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, 
supra note 77. Cf. Toth, The Churches and the New World Order, 11 WoRLD 
JusncE 193 (1969). 
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in 1965.180 Inspired in no small measure by the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights, this declaration pronounces that "the human 
person has a right to religious freedom,"181 which "has its foundation 
in the very dignity of the human person as this dignity is known 
through the revealed word of God and by reason itself."182 Elabora-
ting on this freedom, the declaration states that "all men are to be 
immune from coercion on the part of individuals or of social groups 
and of any human power, in such ways that no one is to be forced to 
act in a manner contrary to his own beliefs, whether privately or 
publicly, whether alone or in association with others, within due 
limits."183 With this declaration-"an effort of the Church to catch 
up with the recognition of a right previously asserted in secular, 
protestant, Jewish and other religious traditions"184-it has been 
observed that "for the first time in many centuries, Christians are 
unanimous in formally proclaiming the universality and inviolability 
of religious freedom. They all agree that it is the right of every man 
and every religious confession."185 A comparable trend is also ob-
servable in the non-Christian world. As Abram has put it, ''In 
Judaism, in Islam, in Marxism, and in other religious or secular 
movements, there have been formulated claims of ultimate truth and 
of the special status that truth entails both for the believer and the 
non-believer, on the one hand, and arguments for the freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion of all men, on the other."186 
The application of proscriptions against religious discrimination 
is, of course, still left to the more general enforcement machinery 
presently available for the protection of other human rights at varying 
180. Reprinted in L. JANSSENS, supra note 179, at 145-60 and in A. CARRILLO DE 
ALBORNOZ, supra note 77, at 169-87. See also A. CARRILLO DE ALBORNOZ, THE BASIS 
OF RELIGIOUS LIBERlY (1963); FREEDOM AND MAN (J. Murray ed. 1965); RELIGIOUS 
LmERlY: AN END AND A BEGINNING (J. Murray ed. 1966). 
181. A. CARRILLO DE ALBORNOZ, supra note 77, at 170; L. JANSSENS, supra note 
179, at 146. 
182. A. CARRILLO DE ALBORNOZ, supra note 77, at 171; L. JANSSENS, supra note 
179, at 147. 
183. A. CARRILLO DE ALBORNOZ, supra note 77, at 170-71; L. JANSSENS, supra 
note 179, at 146-47. 
184. Abram, supra note 1, at 45-46. 
185. A. CARRILLO DE ALBORNOZ, supra note 77, at 155. For the Declarations on 
Religious Liberty issued by the World Council of Churches in 1948 and 1961, .see id. 
at 189-99. The 1948 Declaration pronounced at the outset: ''The rights of religious 
freedom herein declared shall be recognized and observed for all persons without 
distinction as to race, colour, sex, language, or religion, and without imposition of 
disabilities by virtue of legal provision of administrative acts." Id. at 189-90. It then 
proceeded to declare that "Every person" has "the right" to "determine his own faith 
and creed," to "express his religious beliefs in worship, teaching and practice, and to 
proclaim the implications of his beliefs for relationships in a social or political 
community," and to "associate with others and to organize with them for religious 
purposes." Id. at 190-91. Cf. P. WOGAMAN, PROTESTANT FAITII AND RELIGIOUS 
LmERlY (1967). 
186. Abram, supra note 1, at 45. Cf. JUDAISM AND HUMAN RIGIITS (M. Konvitz 
ed. 1972). 
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community levels-national, regional, and global.187 It is to be 
hoped that the proposed International Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion 
or Belief, when finally adopted, will incorporate provisions for imple-
mentation comparable to those built into the International Conven-
tion on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.188 
Meanwhile, it may be noted that, because discriminatory practices are 
sometimes based upon racial as well as religious grounds (such as 
practices conventionally labeled "anti-Semitism"), the machinery of 
implementation established for racial discrimination (especially the 
implementation provisions of the Convention on the Elimination of 
Racial Discrimination) can sometimes be invoked to redress depriva-
tions based upon religious grounds.189 
187. The general problem of implementation will be treated in detail in the 
chapters of our forthcoming book relating to the world constitutive process of 
authoritative decision. 
188. Cf. McDougal, Lasswell & Chen, supra note 47, at 1080-86. See Prelimi-
nary Draft on Additional Measures of Implementation Transmitted to the Commis• 
sion on Human Rights by the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and 
Protection of Minorities, annexed to U.N. Doc. A/8330, supra note 139. See also 
Claydon, supra note 1, at 419-23. 
189. With regard to many homogeneous groups it is difficult to tell whether 
characterizations of the groi;ip are by religion, ethnicity, or language (e.g., the Ibo, 
Dinka, or Zulu). This applies in both developing and developed countries. For such 
groups, protection of freedom from discrimination upon religious grounds may on 
occasion be secured by invocation and application of the prescriptions relating to race 
or language. Cf. Coleman, The Problem of Anti-Semitism Under the International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 2 HUMAN 
RIGHTS J. 609 (1969); Lerner, Anti-Semitism as Racial and Religious Discrimination 
Under United Nations Conventions, 1 ISRAEL Y.B. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 103 (1971); 
McDougal, Lasswell & Chen, supra note 47, at 1061-86. 
The ambiguities of religious and racial discrimination and other confusions are 
hopelessly intermingled in the controversial resolution on Zionism adopted by the 
United Nations General Assembly on Nov. 10, 1975, by a roll-call vote of 72 in 
favor, 35 against, with 32 abstentions. G. A. Res. 3379 (XXX), Resolutions of the 
General Assembly at Its Thirtieth Regular Session (16 Sept.-17 Dec. 1975), at 177, 
U.N. Press Release GA/5438 (19 Dec. 1975); 12 U.N. MoNTIILY CHRONICLE, No. 
11, at 56 (1975). This resolution would appear more a gambit in a series.of political 
maneuvers than an effective condemnation, or expression, of either racial or religious 
discrimination. For a review of the history and possible consequences of this 
resolution, see The Sixth Report of the Committee on Human Rights, the American 
Branch, International Law Association (March 1976) (to be published in 1976 
Annual of the American Branch). See also Assembly Determines Zionism ls Form 
of Racism as Measures Against Racial Discrimination Adopted, 12 U.N. MoNTIILY 
CHRONICLE, No. 11, at 37 (1975); El-Messiri, Zionism and Racism, N.Y. Times, Nov. 
13, at 41, col. 2 (city ed.); Glazer, Zionism Examined, id. Dec. 13, 1975, at 27, col. 
3; id. Nov. 11, 1975; at 1, col. 1. 
For background readings on Zionism, see S. Am.sTRoM, supra note 73, at 972-76 
(1972); I. CoHEN, THE ZIONISI' MOVEMENT (1945); FROM HAVEN TO CONQUEST: 
READINGS IN ZIONSIM AND TIIE PALESTINE PROBLEM UNTIL 1948 (W. el-Khalidi ed. 
1971); J. GONEN, A PSYCHOiilSI'ORY OF ZIONISM (1975); S, HALPERIN, THE 
PoLmCAL WORLD OF AMERICAN ZIONISM (1961); B. HALPERN, THE IDEA OF TIIB 
JEWISH STATE (2d ed. 1969); THE ZIONISI' lDEA: A HrsroRICAL ANALYSIS AND READER 
(A. Hertzberg ed. 1959); T. HERZL, THE JEWISH STATE (DER JUDENSI'AAT) (H. Zohn 
transl. 1970); W. LAQUEUR, A HISTORY OF ZIONISM (1972); 2 B. MARTIN, A HISTORY 
April 1976] Religious Freedom and World Public Order 897 
N. THE INCLUSIVE CoNTEXT OF RELIGIOUS AND 
OTHER BASIC FREEDOMS OF BELIBF 
The trend of past decision in the world community regarding 
matters of fundamental belief has been largely confined to the task of 
formulating acceptable prescriptions. Thus, the world community 
has yet to reach a consensus as to a system of presumptively authori-
tative expectations that can be invoked or applied in the area of 
religious discrimination. Nevertheless, it appears that the rising vol-
ume of national decisions implementing national prescriptions will 
one day be recognized as the preliminary phase of a process that 
marks the eventual appearance and consolidation of an effective 
international law of human rights in matters of religious conviction. 
The intensified demands manifested in the drafting of declara-
tions and conventions have already exercised a profound effect upon 
the perceived policies of the emerging system of world public order. It 
is, for example, more widely understood than ever before that "reli-
gious" freedom is not ultimately to be construed as faith in any 
particular version of divinity. The confrontations that have taken 
place between spokesmen for believers in a single God and spokes-
men for believers in a plurality of gods have educated many of these 
leaders to concede the good faith and the depth of commitment of all 
concerned. A similar confrontation has had a parallel effect among 
exponents of divinity and "atheistic" champions of an impersonal 
flow of determining forces in the universe. Even more striking, 
perhaps, is the partial acceptance of "doubters" or "searchers"-those 
who have chosen to withhold commitment to any theological or 
metaphysical body of doctrine and practice. The scientific attitude 
toward the world, for example, is widely interpreted to exclude other 
than an exploratory and tentative attitude toward the universe. 
For the future it is not implausible to predict that science-based 
technology will continue to spread, and that the tension between 
tentative versus dogmatic attitudes will become one of the most 
polarizing forces within the world community. The conception of 
religious freedom will probably come to be understood to include 
"freedom of fundamental orientation" toward the universal manifold 
of events; however, considerations of political unity may be expected 
to interfere with the genuine acceptance of this idea. When the unity 
of a body politic seems to be endangered by minorities of Christians, 
Jews, or adherents of other religious faiths, or by those who openly 
profess an "atheistic" or "agnostic" position, it will often be a simple 
OF JUDAISM 319-48 (1974); 0. RABINOWICZ, ARNOLD TOYN13EE ON JUDAISM AND 
ZIONISM: A CRITIQUE (1974); R. STEVENS, AMERICAN ZIONISM AND U.S. FOREIGN 
POLICY, 1942-1947 (1962); J. TALMON, ISRAEL AMONG THE NATIONS (1970); PAL-
ESTINE: A SE.ARCH FOR TRum (A. Taylor & R. Tetlie eds. 1970); D. VITAL, 'Iim 
ORIGINS OF ZIONISM (1975). 
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matter to single out and identify members of these groups. During 
crisis periods, discriminatory measures will often be leveled against 
those perceived as dissident individuals and groups. If the level of 
crisis intensifies, it is overwhelmingly probable that the demand for 
political unity will tend to rigidify the position of whatever systems of 
belief are current among the power elites. 
Under circumstances of fear and anxiety, it is well known that 
words and emblems may be among the instruments most relied upon 
to maintain a tolerable level of reassurance; conversely, exposure to 
assertions of disbelief or doubt, or to gestures of rejection, present 
occasions for symbolic defense. The demand to conform typically 
goes beyond insistence on verbal conformity; the proper words must 
also be uttered in tones that are recognized modes of expressing 
conviction. "Tentativeness" arouses suspicions of disloyalty or trea-
son, and the range of tolerance afforded to variety and deviation is 
narrowed by both public and private acts. 
Thus, it can be seen that the difficulties that have retarded the 
evolution of a comprehensive code of rights to protect freedom of 
religion and belief are likely to continue for the foreseeable future. 
Nevertheless, arrangements designed to extend and maintain the basic 
freedom to worship and to choose a belief system will continue to 
influence the differences and apprehensions that divide the members 
of the world community from one another. Freedom of belief is a 
tenacious yet delicate achievement in the history of mankind. 
